4. Notably, while #IS has reported the largest number of attacks from #Iraq, it has claimed *four times* more “confirmed” kills from #Nigeria than anywhere else.
5. As part of the campaign, #IS has been attacking outside its normal sphere of influence.
In #Nigeria, for example, it has deployed two operations in #Taraba and one in #Kogi, 500 km and 1,000 km respectively from its heartlands in #Borno.
6. All that said, the silence from #IS's affiliates in #Mozambique and the #Sahel has persisted, and there have so far been no truly major strategic operations in #Iraq or #Syria.
On that basis, so far at least, this campaign is all about image.
1. In recent months, we’ve been tracking chatter about the World Cup in #Qatar across #IS, #AQ, and Shi'a militant group (#SMG) networks online.
2. Interest has been fairly limited in #AQ & #SMG ecosystems but #IS|ers have been calling for attacks, with momentum for these calls spiking in recent days.
Graphs show incidence of posts with “Qatar” (yellow), “World Cup” (blue), and “football” (red).
3. One #IS call-to-arms singles out teams / supporters of Coalition member states, above all #US and #France.
There have also been multiple assertions that attacks needn’t happen only in #Qatar, the logic being that an attack anywhere during the WC will be maximally disruptive.
1. Following the explosions at #Saky airbase on Tuesday, satellite imagery (from @Planet) of their aftermath has emerged.
Multiple buildings and aircraft were destroyed – with at least three distinct craters clearly apparent.
L: 9 Aug
R: 10 Aug
2. Several aircraft housed in 3-sided berms were destroyed, while others closer to the apparent impact craters seemed to survive.
There are a few possible explanations for this (for e.g., some aircraft may have been carrying munitions while others were not).
L: 9 Aug
R: 10 Aug
3. In videos shared across pro-#Kremlin Telegram that had reportedly been shot immediately after the first 'strike,' smoke can be seen billowing before a large explosion at the site.
1. Over the last few days, we’ve been tracking a major new influence campaign being deployed by the #Taliban in #Afghanistan.
On 22 July, its networks on Twitter and Telegram were three times more active than usual – more active than they've been across all of 2022 to date.
2. This surge was the result of a defensive comms campaign aimed at legitimising the #Taliban, sparked when @Meta banned its media agencies, Bakhtar/RTA, last week.
In the wake of that, thousands started tweeting #BanTaliban in the hope that @Twitter would follow suit.