4/7 Simply because they can only be solved by QMV. There is no chance to come to a solution in #EUCO with unanimity. This will only take time, threatening with disregarding the deadlines set out in the #ConditionalityRegulation &
5/7 leaving the impression behind that for #Berlin & #Paris pleasing #EUAutocrats is always more important than complying with binding #EUlaw & playing in defence of #EUvalues.
6/7 From time to time I get the impression that certain #German stakeholders hasn't learned anything over the past 12 years about #Orbán's #Hungary or #autocratization within the #EU.
7/7 They just follow the same old reflexes and pathways that repeatedly turned out to be wrong. But they try it again and again, anyhow, anyway.
2/19
Over the past two years the European Commission significantly improved its toolkit designed to enhance #RuleOfLaw & impose sanctions over Member States disregarding fundamental EU values.
3/19
The suspension of #ERRF/#RecoveryFund & the triggering of the #ConditionalityRegulation against Hungary’s government left the impression that the Commission drew its lessons from its decade long failure.
I had an interesting conversation on #Polish-#Hungarian relations yesterday under #ChathamHouse rule. I would like to share my key conclusion without further details. It will be highly disturbing from a #Polish perspective, but may contribute to a reflection process.
THREAD 1/15
2/15 #Polish foreign & security policy talks from an intellectual and moral high ground to previously more #Russia-friendly partners, especially #Germany, because PL & the Baltic states correctly predicted Russia's aggressive behaviour,
3/15
while #German & other Western European stakeholders were reluctant to give credit for their correct analysis. As disturbing this lessoning behaviour might be from a German perspective, history demonstrated that #Poland & Baltics have a better understanding of #Russia ...
3/11
Concerning the first one, the requirements of safe shipping through minefields and effective #CoastalDefense are not incompatible, and a mine-free shipping channel to #Odessa would not seriously compromise the port's defence against #Russian#amphibious operations.
2.
and the suspended #RecoveryFunds. #Orbán just repeats his strategy he pursued with success in case of the 2020 EU budget blockade.
He is aware of the fact that due to his rampage in EU politics he has lost nearly all of his persuasive and negotiation power,
3. hence he has to operate with coercion. This is not the first time #Hungary is taking EU decision making as hostage, and not even the last one if #Orbán once again is allowed to succeed with his #blackmailing.
2/12
As I argued a couple of days ago, the transfer of Soviet-era air superiority fighters from #NATO stocks could be an important symbolic move, but they are not the ideal #airdefence assets under the given circumstances. Arguments below 👇
3/12 #Ukrainian ground based #airdefence systems have been really successful over the past 13 days. Even if the transfer of fighter planes is a no go, SAM systems with #Russian origin still in service in NATO countries could be potentially delivered to #Ukraine. @ukraine_world
2/4 There appears to be a growing pattern that #Orbán allies look for investment opportunities in the high-tech end of the international defence & security sector. (See the case of #AeroVodochody and its Hungarian investors) reuters.com/article/uk-aer…
3/4 While acquiring lucrative foreign investments (which the seriously indebted #Spacecom is not) might be a logical strategy for a #corrupt#RentSeeking elite, like the circles of #Orbán, there is definitely more behind this story.