New @nytimes piece captures recent wave of #Iran|ian nationalism, particularly among non-principlists (-conservatives), that seasoned analysts have been noting for some time. But there are some important caveats to consider. nytimes.com/2017/11/26/wor… 1/
One piece of evidence given to prove #Trump & #Saudi have caused #Iran nationalist wave is popularity of #Soleimani & #Zarif. Only one problem: High favourability numbers for both predate Trump election & significantly heightened Iran-Saudi tensions iranpoll.com/publications/j… 3/ 
Another criticism is use of anecdotal, un-systematic, man-on-the-street/elite interviews to make broad claims. Thin evidence indeed. If I tried to do same in a journal article, it would be shot down in peer-review. NYT seems to give #Iran journalist much wider latitude. 4/
Finally, article also fails to address how high a priority foreign policy is for #Iran|ians & how much public opinion actually matters for foreign policymaking. 7/
So NYT article: 1. Misstates origins of #Iran nationalist wave 2. Uses very poor evidence 3. Falls back on lazy Western media tropes about Iran & 4. Doesn't address actual implications of nationalist wave. BUT... 8/
That's not to say there isn't an #Iran nationalist wave, that moving forward #Saudi policies won't exacerbate, & (incoherent) #Trump policies won't strengthen anti-#Americanism. Just not sure how prevalent or enduring this wave will be. 9/
Other major question is to what extent #Iran state, particularly principlists (conservatives), will be able to capitalise on it. In long-term, may turn out to be quite consequential, but something that for now should be confined to anecdotal tweets rather than NYT pieces. 10/10
