An interesting must-read historical account that misses one essential point that several commentators keep failing to understand (short thread)
1) It is certainly correct that the EU acquits is full of complex compromises that will not be reopened for a state that is leaving, but this misses a truly essential point
2) A lot of the ‘control’ that moves to the EU from the member states is (from the U.K. point of view) not a compromise to obtain free trade, but is the tool by which free trade is enabled...
3) Take the CJEU, direct effect and supremacy of EU law. The UK wants that goods complying with U.K. law automatically qualify for the EU...
4) How is that achieved (imperfectly) under EU law? Direct effect & supremacy of the free movement of goods provisions of the treaties, enforced by the CJEU.
5) Yeah, But this is just a part of EU law and not central you say? It certainly is just a part of EU law, but quite central...
6) The case establishing direct effect of EU law, Van Gend & Loos, was a tariff classification case. Free movement of goods cases are essential reading for EU lawyers
7) So: some of the things we reject (CJEU, direct effect, supremacy) are not compromises to get what we wanted, they were the very tools achieving what we wanted
