It needs to be pointed out more often that almost all of our calculations of the difficulty of disruptive climate action presume essentially no meaningful political change, and thus a world where solutions must compete in broken markets with only minimal state help.
Only extremely rarely are genuinely large-scale changes discussed, like national war-level mobilizations...
newrepublic.com/article/135684…
newrepublic.com/article/135684…
Or massive re-allocations of capital...
Or genuinely strong regulations/policies for keeping fossil fuels in the ground...
vox.com/energy-and-env…
vox.com/energy-and-env…
Or increasing the legal exposure of fossil fuel companies... or intentional efforts to pop the Carbon Bubble... etc etc etc
There are dozens of powerful levers for change that our discussions largely exclude from consideration.
There are dozens of powerful levers for change that our discussions largely exclude from consideration.
That may (or may not) be smart and savvy when discussing how much climate action is LIKELY.
But declaring how much action is POSSIBLE while ignoring these levers undercuts the realism of those declarations, and shortchanges the public.
We need keep the Overton Window open here.
But declaring how much action is POSSIBLE while ignoring these levers undercuts the realism of those declarations, and shortchanges the public.
We need keep the Overton Window open here.
Also...
