,
12 tweets,
3 min read
Read on Twitter
1. Here's the first immediate practical question that will follow US recognition of Israeli sovereignty in the Golan Heights. What will become of UNDOF, the UN Disengagement Observer Force which monitors Israeli and Syrian compliance with the 1974 Disengagement Agreement.
2. UNDOF has posts on both sides of the area of separation, some in (or reachable through) Israeli-held territory (west of Line A, basically the 1967 armistice line) and some in Syrian territory (east of Line A). Here's the text: ecf.org.il/media_items/595
3. At various times during the Syrian civil war, UNDOF's positions on the Syrian side were overrun by various rebel groups, which concerned Israel greatly. More recently, they are (I believe) fully deployed. Here's a map: undof.unmissions.org/sites/default/…
4. Despite annexing the Golan in 1981, Israel never expelled UNDOF from the territory it controls, or denied it access. On the contrary, it works well with UNDOF, which it counts on to monitor Syrian compliance with the disengagement, including keeping its forces east of Line B.
5. Just last week, upon revealing the presence of a Hezbollah terrorist cell in the Syrian Golan, the IDF spokesman called on Syria to uphold the 1974 agreement, which forbids military forces from approaching Israeli territory.
6. So UNDOF remains key. But if Israel &the US see Line A as an international border, that calls UNDOF's mission into question. Israel may seek to maintain a UN presence on what it sees as its sovereign territory. But will the US continue to fund such a mission? Will others?
7. Syria could change its approach to UNDOF, either telling it to leave, restricting its movements, or allowing it to be threatened. Or it could say the new status quo allows it to bring or allow forces into the area of separation, up to the Israeli-claimed international border.
8. Israel won't want UNDOF to leave the Syrian side, or to allow any Syrian violations of the agreement, with or without UNDOF present. It could certainly find ways to disincentivize any such moves by Syria. But those are potentially escalatory scenarios.
9. The point is that the logic of UNDOF continuing to observe the separation of forces arranged in 1974, after the 1973 war, remains in everyone's interests.
10. But if the old 1967 armistice line (Line A) is going to be treated by Israel and the US as an international border, UNDOF may need a new mandate, and its support by one or both of the sides, or other UN members and funders, could weaken.
11. So right off the bat, just days after Israel called on Syria to uphold the 1974 agreement to stop terrorists approaching Israeli territory, for which UNDOF is key, questions are raised about how the US decision affects it.
12. Has the Administration anticipated these questions, and does it have answers? We'll see.
End
End
