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10 tweets,
2 min read
Read on Twitter
1) Fear that US might pull out of NATO way bigger in Berlin than in Washington DC; experts don’t expect Trump to try (and the consensus seems to be that he can’t).
2) However, if Germany dramatically underdelivers on its promise to spend 2% or at least 1,5% on defense, than longer-term trust is undermined in DC on both sides of the aisle, leading to who-knows-what.
3) Huawei issue probably most important issue for DC on the transatlantic agenda, more important than NS2. Trump apparently personally pushing this.
4) Great power competition as laid out by James Mattis in the December 2018 National Defense Strategy is really the new paradigm of US foreign policy; for Republicans and Democrats alike.
5) While systemic competition with China and Russia animates a lot of action, and gives overall direction, systemic chaos inside the administration undermines the ability to act consistently. A certain Twitter feed remains a major problem.
6) War on terror is really dead, and the Middle East and North Africa aren’t a priority anymore (despite the anti-Iranian aspect of Trump’s foreign policy). The US has run out of ideas and of willingness to shape the region.
7) Question of car tariffs a „Trump thing“, likely to go away when he leaves office.
8) There is concern about Democrats: isolationism might be quite strong under a future Democratic US president, perhaps also protectionism. In other words: Europeans, be careful what you wish for.
9) China could be the big thing bringing Europeans and Americans together, but Europeans suspect that US only wants to prevent the rise of a peer competitor, not so much forcing China to play by the rules. WH apparently sees European as not really helpful on China so far. (tbc)
10) My conclusion: In the next years everything is going to be re-evalued under the new paradigm of great power competition. „Systemic competition“ with China is going to be the axis around which US foreign policy will rotate in the next years (if not decades).
