,
7 tweets,
2 min read
Read on Twitter
20 Minuten - «Kein Land kann sicheres E-Voting garantieren» - News 20min.ch/schweiz/news/s… via @20min
Some of this interview got a little lost in translation, but the gist remains the same. I can't see a path towards secure evoting that doesn't feature a full detailed investigation into how the Swiss Post system came to feature so many critical cryptographic flaws.
These issues shouldn't just be patched up, we need to understand how they came to exist in the first place, why internal reviews at Scytl, and external audits by Swiss Post, KPMG et al didn't uncover them.
(Or as in the case of the first critical vulnerability, why it was apparently discovered but never fixed - did we ever get a straight story from Scytl/Swiss Post on that one?)
When designing secure systems the process is as important as, if not more important than, the product. It's not enough to demonstrate a secure system (they didn't), you have to be able to demonstrate how your process catches errors before they become issues.
And, no, relying on an international team of uncompensated researchers to tear your code apart on twitter is not a "process"
btw, I was absolutely serious about this bet
