Thread by @thomasjuneau

I have a new article with @PSQuarterly on the JCPOA. The article is available in open access here; below is a quick thread on why I explain in the article that those who argue that Iran emerged as the clear winner from the JCPOA are wrong. (1/11)

onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.10…

Did Iran emerge as the winner from the nuclear deal it agreed to with the P5+1 in July 2015? According to critics, the answer is yes: the JCPOA lifted restrictions on Iran and allowed it to enhance its position as a dominant player in the Middle East. (2)

For example, Donald Trump referred to the JCPOA as a “fantastic” deal for Iran. John McCain referred to a fast‐expanding Iran as “on the march.” Ray Takeyh wrote that Iran would become a “more aggressive imperial power” after the JCPOA, enabling its “imperial surge.” (3)

Critics paint the JCPOA as excessively advantageous to Iran because it relaxed many constraints on its power. For Mark Dubowitz, the JCPOA opens the door wide for Iran to reintegrate the international economy by dismantling “much of the international sanctions architecture.” (4)

In Israel defense minister Moshe Ya'alon argued that Iran was exploiting the deal “to gain hegemony” in the Middle East. Even balanced observers unbound by ideological hostility to Iran claimed, as did The Economist, that Iran after the JCPOA was “preparing for take‐off.” (5)

It is undeniable the JCPOA has benefited Iran. Yet the claim that it has significantly gained from the nuclear deal is premised on a narrow reading of what transpired after January 2016, when the deal was implemented: that by lifting some sanctions, the JCPOA resulted in... (6)

...the diplomatic and economic unshackling of Iran and therefore significantly benefited its ability to generate power and project influence. This misses the bigger picture: most of the constraints on Iran's power and influence that existed before 2016 remain in place... (7)

since the implementation of the JCPOA. There are four types of such constraints: Iran's strategic loneliness, international sanctions, the containment ring surrounding the Islamic Republic, and Iran's own economic mismanagement. (8)

The key point: Of these four constraints on Iran's power, three and a half have remained after 2016 and will likely remain for the foreseeable future. (9)

Crucially, this was true before Trump started imposing renewed sanctions on Iran when it decided to cease participating in the JCPOA in 2018. These latest sanctions impose major additional burdens on Iran, but they do not change the fundamental assessment... (10)

...explained here that it is inaccurate to claim—as supporters of the Trump administration's decision do—that the JCPOA brought significant benefits to Iran and led to an unshackling of its power. (end)