Thread by @EBKania

The Pentagon's annual report on China's military power has just been released. I may share a few random reactions and observations as I read through it this evening. media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/20…

It's great to see the report point to 'civil-military integration' and highlight its multifaceted character. However, I'm among those who argue "military-civil fusion" should be the preferred translation for 军民融合, since it's literal and differentiates this from antecedents.

That is, "military-civil fusion" builds upon but goes much deeper than civil-military integration (军民结合) under Hu Jintao and otherwise. The difference between and appropriate translations of 融合 relative to 结合 are the sorts of things China watcher like to debate... :)

I'd add that national defense mobilization is another priority for military-civil fusion, to which this report dedicates quite limited attention, but I'd argue it's important to understand the strengths and weaknesses of this system in its totality. inspire2serve.gov/_api/files/200

I agree generally with the report's assessment that the demands of defending "One Belt, One Road" projects could result in new PLA basing overseas, and certainly Chinese military strategists have highlighted the new need for "internationalizing" Chinese military power.

However, I don't think we should mirror image or assume that the PLA's approach to basing will mimic that of the U.S. necessarily. Could Chinese military power have a lighter overseas footprint? I'd expect we may see more use of UAVs before we see more basing overseas.

The special topic of "influence operations" is clearly warranted. This is a critical challenge. I'd commend the insights of those studying CCP united front work, including @Anne_MarieBrady, @PLMattis, @Stokes2049, @alexjoske, and @tombschrader, to anyone looking to learn more.

I'd also argue (and be curious to hear others thoughts) for less use of the phrase "influence operations" and greater consistency in discussing the united front and on PLA political warfare and psychological operations, since language is important to informing our understanding.

Any discussion of discourse power" is also missing from this report, but I'd highlight that as a core concept that ought to inform our understanding of how the PRC/CCP approaches influence, from technical standards to international institutions. ccpwatch.org/single-post/20…

Also on the subject of psychological operations, I'd highlight that Base 311, the PLA's 'three warfares base,' can now be confirmed to have been incorporated into the PLA Strategic Support Force, which I've argued may be significant. globaltaiwan.org/2017/02/15-gtb…

The PLA is exploring and may be starting to experiment with techniques to adapt political work and psychological warfare to the cyber age--and may also leverage AI-enabled techniques for propaganda and otherwise. Taiwan could be a frontline and testbed for that experimentation.

I appreciate the more detailed discussion of emerging technologies, including robotics and artificial intelligence, advanced computing, quantum technology, and hypersonic and directed-energy weapons, since those developments received less attention in prior years of this report.

I've been emphasizing since 2016 that the PLA is starting to highlight military intelligentization (智能化) as the stage beyond informatization, in preparation for intelligentized warfare. It's great to see this concept made it into the annual report this year for the first time.

However, I'd take issue with the report's definition of "intelligentized warfare," as "using multiple data streams and information flows to enable PLA operations." First, to my knowledge, there's no official PLA definition of this concept to date.

For context, the phrase "智能化" can be found in some earlier writings on smart weapons and precision warfare. So I half-joke sometimes that viable alternative translation are 'smart warfare' or the 'smart-ificiation' of warfare.

Today, when multiple Chinese military strategists use this phrase, it alludes generally to ways in which warfare is being transformed beyond the information age with the advent of artificial intelligence and its operationalization.

So my usual description of "intelligentized warfare," going off of a range of Chinese military writings, is: future warfare in an age in which the potential of artificial intelligence has been realized through a range of applications, transforming the form or character of war.

So too, "military intelligentization" might be defined as the development and actualization of artificial intelligence, along with related technologies, not only in weapons systems but also in the 'system of systems' that enables military operations.

In this regard, the DoD report's limited discussion of "intelligentized warfare" does not appear to reflect a recognition that this concept is at the heart of how the PLA sees and is preparing for future warfare, at least by my assessment. I'll welcome any debate and discussions.

This point on the targeting of sensitive military technologies for theft makes me think of the great article by @aa_gilli and @Mauro_Gilli on the topic, which I'd highly recommend to anyone who hasn't read it yet. mitpressjournals.org/doi/full/10.11…

How do we best assess the likely returns from such theft and tech transfer? What is the probability the PLA will succeed eventually in catching up, and how will the challenges of doing so differ across sectors and technologies? There are so many questions that remain unanswered.

Speaking of research questions, Chinese industrial policy is such a rich issue and remains relatively under-examined. I know this is a report on military power primarily, but I wish it had mentioned more than "Made in China 2025," which is infamous but not the only key piece.

I often prefer too emphasize China's National Strategy for Innovation-Driven Development as the overarching architecture that provides the guidance, direction, and perhaps ideology that ties together a range of industrial policies.

Speaking of issues meriting more attention, the special topic on China in the Arctic is a great inclusion. I'd also urge anyone looking for a more detailed assessment to read @Anne_MarieBrady's 2017 book, China as a Polar Great Power, which is phenomenal. amazon.com/China-as-Polar…

I'd add that China is using a lot of drones and robotic systems in the Arctic, and I have a slide-deck on that topic from last fall for anyone who is curious or otherwise interested.

While I'm droning on about drones, it was nice to see a write-up on PLA UAVs in this report, which mentions that the BZK-005 (often to be found in the East and South China Seas) is being upgraded.

For anyone looking for more on PLA UAVs, I published a study on the topic last summer thanks to @CASI_Research that may be of interest, though it's now slightly out of date in some places. airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CAS…

And here's even more discussion in the report of PLA UAVs as important to augmenting ISR and logistics. We ignore the PLA's apparent enthusiasm for drones at our peril!

Returning to AI, here is an important assessment from the report regarding the continued progression of PLA command automation, including the potential integration of emerging technologies to enhance situational awareness and decision-making. (Cc @paul_scharre, @mchorowitz)

That is consistent with my assessment in this white paper of how AI may be leveraged in PLA command decision-making. Also, to clarify, I thought that typo had been fixed, but that's not my email, so please don't bother Benny Kania (no relation as far as I know)...

Perhaps less 'sexy' than AI but also critically important is Chinese electronic warfare, about which this report includes some valuable information. "The PLA considers electronic warfare (EW) an integral component of modern warfare." Indeed! (Cc @Whitney_McN)

When we talk about the future of Chinese information operations, the PLA Strategic Support Force looms large, and it's great to see more discussion of it this year, including some of its 2018 training activities. However...

I'd note this DoD report provides few/no new details beyond what those of us who have been tracking the PLASSF based on open sources since the day it was created (including @CostelloJK, @Stokes2049 @McReynoldsJoe, and myself, plus others not on Twitter), assessed as early as 2016

and for that reason, I wish that these annual reports could include footnotes to acknowledge the contributions of open-source research, the value of which I'm afraid can be unfortunately under-appreciated in some cases.

I'd highly recommend this excellent and authoritative monograph by @CostelloJK and @McReynoldsJoe on the PLASSF, which was published last fall: ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Doc…

Continuing onward with some weekend reflections as I return to reading, I want to draw attention to the report's discussion of the PLA's new 2018 Outline of Military Training and Evaluation. It's worth noting the increased emphasis of PLA training on “strong military opponents.”

The topic of training merits more detailed consideration as a critical determinant of the PLA's actual capability to 'fight and win,' particularly as a military lacking relevant combat experience in recent history.

For an excellent assessment of PLA Air Force training, I'd recommend this @CASI_Research report by Jana and Ken Allen, which discusses “four key training brands” that the PLAAF has adopted as its training shifts to more of a combat-oriented direction. airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CAS…

Often, the PLA's lack of combat experience is seen as a major liability, but improvements in training could compensate for that deficit. This commentary from Tim Heath is very thoughtful on the question of how combat experience matters in particular. rand.org/blog/2018/11/c…

In this piece, Dr. Heath emphasizes, "combat experience does not automatically translate into military advantage. Militaries require institutions, processes, and procedures that can learn the right lessons from battlefield experience and improve their performance."

In this regard, I'd raise the question of the PLA's capability to be a 'learning organization.' Lately, I've been using the tagline 'learning without fighting' to describe how the PLA is looking to learn from other militaries' wars, peacetime experiences, and even wargaming.

The PLA has experimented with the use of virtual/augmented reality in training, while exploring new directions in war-gaming, including the use of AI, as I discussed recently in this piece for @ChinaBriefJT. jamestown.org/program/learni…

These trends will be worth watching going forward, not to mention the intellectual dimensions of these activities, including the role of the PLA's Academy of Military Science, which has a new post-reform concentration on defense technological innovation. battlefieldsingularity.com/musings-1/incu…

As we look to assess the PLA's future trajectory, I think it's worth dwelling upon the objective that Xi Jinping prominently articulated in his fall 2017 Party Congress work report, that the PLA will become a "world-class" military by mid-century.

This DoD report mentions this concept of the PLA as a "world-class" military a number of times but doesn't specify, define, or discuss what precisely being a world-class military means for the PLA.

Does the PLA's tasking to become a world-class military imply that it aspires to be on par with the U.S. military or outright surpass the U.S. military? To dominate the region or establish global capabilities for power projection? This question is worth careful consideration.

I'd also raise a question of translation: 世界一流军队. Is that better rendered as "global first-class" or "world-class" military? The official English translation posted through Xinhua uses the phrase "world-class forces here. web.archive.org/web/2019050414…

I'll defer to a native speaker on the precise connotations of this term (世界一流军队), and I'd also point out that this and other concepts articulated by Xi Jinping do not spring fully formed like Athena from his head necessarily, so to speak.

That is, rather lofty concepts and objectives (e.g., China Dream, even One Belt, One Road) are often first articulated and then further conceptualized, taking shape and evolving towards more of a coherent strategic agenda.

So, what it means to the CCP/PLA to have/be a truly "world-class" force may take shape and evolve over time, as China's national strength continues grow, and its national interests expand to to take on global scope and scale. But the ambition is clear.