Thread by @tshugart3

I happened to read this article (with great interest) recently and I have some...thoughts about it:

https://twitter.com/cnlyonsjones/status/1120623614972321792

On the topic of the military balance in Asia, it was published in International Security, a peer-reviewed academic journal published by Harvard’s @BelferCenter.

belfercenter.org/publication/em…

In general, the author seemed pretty sanguine about China’s military challenge.

In summary, “China’s maritime neighbors can prevent China from dominating East Asia militarily, allowing the United States to avoid the costs and risks of expanding its forces in the region...", as

“These states have developed antiaccess/area-denial capabilities that can deny China command of its near seas. The United States should support these capabilities while taking steps to enhance crisis stability.”

As I got into the meat of the operational analysis that underpins the strategic conclusions, I stumbled over specific items that jumped out to me as just not sounding right - facts that seem to me to be cherry-picked, presented inconsistently, or that seemed just flat-out wrong.

First, in an example presented to bolster the idea that China would have a hard time knocking out Taiwan’s air force, the author states that in the first Gulf War, “most of Iraq’s air force…survived and fought on.”

My reaction: What? I’m old enough to remember that war...

...what I remember was that most of the IAF was taken out on the ground, those that took off in anger were shot down immediately, and most of the survivors fled to Iran (and never came back). And I certainly don’t recall any significant part of the IAF “fighting on”.

Sure enough, from the USAF:
- most of the IAF (407 of 729) fixed wing combat aircraft were destroyed or fled
- 0 U.S. airplanes shot down by IAF aircraft
- US/coalition air forces had complete air supremacy, allowing all aircraft to operate w/ impunity

afhra.af.mil/Portals/16/doc…

The author also points out that many of Taiwan’s air bases have hardened shelters w/ 6-ft walls, implying those would be impervious to PLAAF/PLARF strikes. I’ll only point out that the same Air Force analysis of the Gulf War air campaign provides this blunt assessment:

Also, we now have open-source imagery (which @cnasdc published over a year before this article, to media attention) that indicates that the PLARF has developed ballistic missiles with penetrators that appear able to pierce hardened aircraft shelters.

Later, the author analyzes the number of troops China could deliver via the PLA’s amphibious assault ships. After coming up w/ a number (18K/day), he states China could transport more via fishing boats/CG, but that they “cannot hold large numbers of personnel or armored vehicles”

The obvious question at this point to me (and likely to anyone who has considered this question in any detail) is: What about the Chinese merchant fleet???

One need look no further than Popular Science to know the Chinese govt specifically requires some civilian vessels, including roll-on/roll-off vessels that can carry hundreds of armored vehicles, to be available and well-fitted for mobilization in wartime.
popsci.com/chinese-cargo-…

Next up, in an analysis of whether the PLAN possesses sufficient gunfire capability to support a landing, the author states “According to U.S. Navy standards, an attacker needs to saturate every 1,000-square-yard zone of land with 24 5-inch rounds per minute.”

I found this interesting, and was curious where the author obtained this benchmark.”

Tracing to the original source, it turns out that it was derived from an analysis of U.S. fleet operations in *the Korean War*. One could imagine that a few things have changed since then.

Also worth noting: since the author assesses the 200+ guns of the PLAN are not enough to invade a 4-6 mile front per the analysis (which mixes square miles with linear miles btw), one would presume that the entire USN (which mounts a bit over 100 5-inch guns) couldn't either.🤔

In a discussion of China’s potential losses in a ground invasion of Taiwan, the author points out the U.S. lost roughly 10% of its troops on the beaches of Normandy. If you include wounded with those missing or killed, it was about 9% - close enough, in any case.

But, then the author goes on to say PLA losses *during each wave* would be higher than 10%. I'm no expert here, but this just doesn't sound right, as after the first wave drives the defenders from the beaches, casualty rates for troops going ashore should drop.

And if Normandy is to be used as a data point at the conclusion of the Normandy campaign the total casualty rate, including all of the waves coming ashore - and then weeks of fighting to break out of the peninsula, was at about 10% overall (out of over 2 million troops).

Later, in the course of providing evidence to support the idea that Taiwan could not be forced into submission by submarine blockade, the author presents some facts that were news to me:

First, that the German submarine campaign in WWII collapsed after 2 months.

Perhaps 2 months is a timeframe arrived at by being somewhat choosy about at what point the Allies truly mounted a “dedicated” ASW campaign, but I’d hardly call the Battle of the Atlantic a 2-month job.

He also claims the U.S. blockade against Japan was enforced only after the U.S. gained "command of the seas" around Japan. I think this would've been news to millions of tons of Japanese ships sunk by U.S. subs thru 1944, long before the U.S. fleet was able to operate there.

More to follow, but for now it's time for dinner...

Ok, continuing on: after dismissing the effectiveness of submarine blockades, the author asserts that the PLAN's ASW helicopters are incapable of operating from PLAN surface ships.

Please enjoy these photos of PLAN ASW helicopters operating from surface ships and doing ASW things.

Honestly, this is kind of baffling. I mean, I literally walked past a Z-9C sitting on the flight deck of a Type 052D in port for RIMPAC.

OTOH, the author places on the scales recent U.S. development of “submarine hunting drones” (plural). Such development consisted of a single prototype (as it does still), w/ no ASW testing yet announced & operational deployment still yrs in the future.
news.usni.org/2019/04/29/sea…

Later, in a discussion of China’s potential to contest control of the ECS w/ Japan, the author states the PLAN “has almost no mine-clearing capability”. This also baffled me, as the PLAN has *dozens* of minesweepers – in fact, I’d guess the most of any Navy on the planet!

Here's discussion on this topic from the Office of Naval Intelligence's 2015 report on the PLAN.

Certainly, one could debate whether China's MCM forces are good enough for the challenge, better than ours, etc. But "almost no mine-clearing capability"?

And oh BTW:

nationalinterest.org/blog/america-g…

At multiple points discussing sea control in the SCS, the author states Chinese forces would have to cycle b/w the combat theater & bases hundreds of miles away in southern China. But China already built 3 huge bases with hundreds of acres of fuel tanks, munitions storage, etc.

The author does acknowledge that China “could fly a few fighters from airstrips on Fiery Cross, Subi, and Mischief Reefs.”

A few? There are *72* climate-controlled, fighter-sized hangars among those three island airbases.

But, he states, these assets have “limited defenses” and probably “would not last long in a major war”.

Limited defenses like long-range HQ-9 SAMs, 500+km anti-ship missiles, and point-defense gun and missile systems on each corner of each island? warontherocks.com/2016/09/chinas…

And to be clear, these are probably the largest & best-defended bases anywhere on or around the South China Sea.

As an example here are the facilities at Fiery Cross, smallest of China's "Big 3" bases, compared w/ the new Malaysian base in the Natunas that the author discusses.

Discussing Malaysia’s air force, he states its Su-30 fighters can launch Kh-31 antiship missiles "beyond the range of the air defenses of China’s ships”

🤔

Jane's says:
Kh-31P (longest range variant known to be operated by Malaysia) - 110km

HHQ-9 (on Type 052D DDGs) - 150km

In discussing the Vietnamese submarine force, I also found it interesting that the author brought up the Royal Navy’s travails in the Falklands as evidence that the PLAN might have difficulty with even a single Vietnamese Kilo submarine (never mind the PLAN has those, too)...

...when, just a few pages back we were told that, were a Chinese submarine to so much as fire at a merchant ship, it would be immediately pinpointed (and presumably destroyed).

With regard to the balance at sea, the author states that China's cruise missiles currently outrange those of the USN, but that soon (by 2019) all will be well, with new 1000-mile U.S. ship-launched missiles and 570-mile range air-launched weapons.

And I am baffled yet again, as one of the referenced articles - which discusses the 1,000-mile range maritime Tomahawk missile, itself says that the weapon system will not even begin testing until 2021, much less be operationally relevant by 2019. washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoin…

Well, that's enough.

For all I know, Dr. Beckley's overall take may be right, as there are a nearly inconceivable number of variables that could affect the balance; and a lot here is true.

But as I said, there were also some details that didn't look quite right to me.

The end.

As always, all opinions my own & do not represent DoD/Navy/USG.