Thread by @jpolga

The Trump administration's economic embargo against Venezuela seems like a policy aimed more at cultivating domestic electoral support than bringing about democratic change in Venezuela.

I could be wrong, of course, but a policy with such a poor track record augers poorly.

First, to summarize. Executive Order 13692:
1. Blocks all Venezuelan govt property and stipulates that such assets "may not be transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn, or otherwise dealt in." (primary sanctions), and

2. Precludes any dealing with Venezuela or anyone who is assisting Maduro or the Maduro Regime (secondary sanctions).

The problems with this doubling down of sanctions are manifold.

First, academic research is pretty emphatic at showing that embargoes like this rarely succeed (see: mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.116…).

This same foreign policy of economic strangulation has failed for 60 years to bring about change in Cuba and is not succeeding in North Korea or Iran.

Second, as the Trump administration's experience with Iran shows, there is no guarantee that Venezuela’s allies (some of whom are themselves being sanctioned by the US) would comply with the secondary sanctions.

Extra-territorial compliance is difficult to guarantee, too.

Third, in terms of bringing about democratic change, the move may actually backfire by alienating Lima Group and EU allies and undercutting the multilateral effort.

Fourth -and this cannot be understated- it allows Maduro and his cronies to credibly blame the US for any worsening of economic and humanitarian conditions. General sanctions exacerbate existing problems and simultaneously strengthen existing authoritarian governments.

In short, history shows that sanctions are unlikely to succeed and much more likely to worsen conditions for ordinary Venezuelans.

Less importantly, it also indicates that Bolton and his team appear to be out of ideas with respect to Venezuela.

Colombia knows what's up