Despite capital controls and the likely compression of imports, Lebanon’s external financing needs will remain high at $9-10bn per year. This assumes imports fall by 30%, LL at 2000, capital controls on FX deposits remain in place, no new inflows. That’s still around 18% of GDP. 
At first glance, the BdL’s headline reserves figures seems sufficient to cover current account deficit financing and repayments of Eurobonds and BdL's USD CDs (principal and interest) coming due in 2020-21.
But chart also shows that none of those FX needs can be met once the banks’ negative net foreign asset position is taken into account. As @AndyKhalil1 eloquently puts it, #BdL cannot cover banks’ foreign liabilities using fake Lebanese dollars
That means #Lebanon still needs to find at least $9bn per year in FX funding (under scenario where imports lower by 30%). Even an outright default on maturing FX debt next year wouldn’t be enough. That’s why the only way is to secure foreign funding
Lebanon would likely qualify for exceptional access from #IMF, which judging from other countries experiences could mean around 1000% of quota, or roughly $9bn over a 3-year programme. The idea would be to catalyse funding from other sources (CEDRE, GCC), to cover funding needs
For clues as to how this might play out, it’s useful to look at countries with similar sizeable funding gaps and large banking sector recapitalisation costs could help. The table below highlights some examples. @AzarsTweets @Mohdfaour89
