1. It took me years to understand the sinister strategic genius of Ghassem Soleimani. This is the abridged story (based on my @WSJ essay) of the world from his eyes, and how his decisions-coupled w/ costly US errors-impacted the lives of tens of millions wsj.com/articles/the-s…
2. Rewind to 2001. After 9/11, a nervous Iran cooperated w/ the US to oust the Taliban (their mutual adversary) from Afghanistan. Months later Iran was furious when George W Bush placed them in the 'Axis of Evil'-along with Iraq and N Korea-in his 2002 State of the Union Speech.
3. Bush’s speech reinforced the cynical view of Tehran’s hardliners, like Ayatollah Khamenei and his trusted commander Soleimani, that cooperation w the US was futile. They became convinced that the looming US invasion of Iraq was part of a plan to bring down the Iranian regime
4. Tehran believed, not w/o reason, the US sought a military presence in Iraq to threaten Iran w regime change and/or establish a Shiite-led Iraqi democracy to undermine Iran’s theocracy. With its existence at stake, Iran wanted to make sure the Iraq war was a smoldering failure
5. As the Taliban fell, Iran detained hundreds of al Qaeda fighters seeking refuge in Iran, including Bin Laden family members and Zarqawi, al-Qaeda's future leader in Iraq. While many in Iran viewed these Sunni jihadists as threats, Soleimani realized they could also be assets
6. Soleimani made sure these jihadis were treated as “guests” in Iran. One senior al-Qaeda operative, Saif al-Adel, had access to a posh gym in Tehran where he swam alongside foreign diplomats. Soleimani himself shared meals w Bin Laden’s sons, who warmly called him Hajji Qassem
7. The above information--and much more--we know from the superb investigative reporting of @AdrianMLevy and @cathyscottclark in their excellent book, “The Exile”. Here is an except in @TheAtlantic theatlantic.com/international/…
8. Many of these jihadis didn’t trust Soleimani, believing he might sell them out to make a deal w/ the US. When Iran concluded the US couldn't be trusted, however, Soleimani unleashed many of these jihadists into Iraq, just before the US invasion. Their impact was devastating.
9. In August 2003, Zarqawi-who was released from detention in Iran-conducted 3 horrific bombings that sabotaged US plans for Iraq. The first attacks, against the Jordanian Embassy and the UN, killed over 200 people and repelled foreign embassies and international NGOs from Iraq
10. Soleimani conceived of using Sunni jihadists to counter the US in Iraq similar to how the US used Sunni jihadists to counter the USSR in Afghanistan in the 1980s; tactical allies against a common enemy. Because Iran is Shiite, it also had plausible deniability
11. Zarqawi's third bombing targeted a sacred Najaf mosque that killed nearly 100 Shia worshippers (including a prominent cleric) during Friday prayers. This helped to radicalize Iraq’s Shiite majority, pushing them closer to Iran and Soleimani (who could offer them protection)
12. Just months after the US invasion, the debate in Washington shifted sharply: Instead of asking how a triumphant US could help Iraq to shape Iran, the question became how an embattled U.S. could stop Iran from shaping Iraq.
13. Zarqawi's barbarism, coupled with enormous US mistakes-such as the disbandment of the Iraqi army and abu-Ghraib- triggered a regional sectarian war. Sunni radicals fueled Shia retribution, which in turn helped spawn ISIS, which provided Soleimani a pretext for his militias
14. Soleimani figured out how to franchise Iran's Shia militias-using the model of Lebanese Hezbollah-to project regional power and buoy vulnerable allies, such as Syria's Assad regime (displacing 13 million Syrians and killing over 600K in the process, including via poison gas)
15. Soleimani also understood something unique: Though Shia are the minority, Iran's huge asymmetric advantage over Sunni rivals (like Saudi Arabia) is that all Shia extremists will fight for Iran, while most Sunni extremists-like ISIS and al Qaeda-want to overthrow Saudi Arabia
16. Even after Soleimani’s death, this legacy outlives him: The Islamic Republic of Iran remains the only nation state in the Middle East that can harness both Shia radicalism, and, at times, Sunni radicalism (including the Taliban and Hamas), even while fighting against ISIS
17. Today the prospects of meaningful US-Iran cooperation is virtually nil: Iran's powerless diplomats may express a desire to cooperate w the US against Sunni radicals, but Iran's powerful Revolutionary Guards will likely continue to conspire with Sunni radicals against the US
18. There is a real danger that Trump's assassination of Soleimani will energize Iran’s Shia extremists/militias (which in turn could revitalize Sunni extremists like ISIS). While they lack popular support, many now feel the same existential angst that Soleimani felt in 2002
19. Expect Soleimani's IRGC comrades--and the Shia militias he helped build--will attempt to avenge his killing. In my @Time int'l cover essay this week I write about ways Iran may try and sabotage Trump's reelection, as they did w Jimmy Carter in 1979 time.com/5762017/iran-l… 
20. Popular fury, however, may limit the regime's ability/mandate to respond. For most Iranians the downing of 176 civilians in Ukraine Airways flight 752 was a far more devastating blow than the killing of Soleimani, and they're ready for this 40-year cycle of violence to end .
Here is the essay wsj.com/articles/the-s…
