The stated goal is to allow #Kyiv to negotiate implementation of the 2015 Minsk II agreements, which outline a political settlement to the conflict, with those directly concerned: residents of territories currently outside government control.
The Council will discuss Ukraine's constitutional reforms on decentralisation, which will determine what political status these areas would have in a re-united Ukraine - and plans for elections in these areas under Ukrainian law, as required by the Steinmeier Formula.
It will have 10 reps from gov't-held areas & 10 from areas outside gov't control - all with voting rights on the council. It will adopt non-binding recommendations to the TCG by 3/4 majority vote. OSCE, Russia, France, and Germany will have consultative powers if they take part.
The council will gather every two weeks, a day before planned TCG meeting. Each side decides on the candidates to the council independently. An OSCE representative moderates, with two deputies from gov't -held and non-gov't held areas each.
For the first time, reps. of the non-gov't-controlled areas' Moscow-backed regimes were identified as “plenipotentiary”. They are Nataliya #Nikanorova and Vladislav #Deinego, “foreign ministers” of the so-called #Donetsk and #Luhansk people's republics respectively.
This preliminary decision sparked a hot debate in Ukraine, prompting over 50 MPs from the presidential party “Sluha Narodu” ("Servant of the People") to sign a collective appeal to #Zelenskyy to cancel the agreement.
Zelenskyy's own deputies said the Council could undermine Ukrainian legislation recognising non-gov't held areas as temporarily occupied by Russia & weaken international sanctions on RF - without solving security issues.
The news about the Council coincided with the 14 Mar. "March of Volunteers", which up to 5,000 may have attended, including combatants. They protested against Zelenskyy, “capitulation” and “legalization" of the Russia-backed regimes.
The other event that also fueled criticism was a presentation of the “National platform for reconciliation and unity” led by National Security advisor Serhiy Syvokho. He urged dialogue with citizens from separatists-held territories.
Members of the National Corps party & Azov battalion veterans stormed the presentation, accusing Syvokho of whitewashing Russia's role in the conflict. Eventually, two pushed Syvokho, who fell on the floor. Police did not intervene at first, but later placed one on house arrest.
Proponents of the agreement say the idea of the Advisory council goes in line with the Minsk agreements, which requires coordination with NGA reps. It will bring opinion and community leaders to the table instead of politicians. The RF will remain a side of negotiations.
As of now the candidates to this council have not been identified. Yermak says they will be "people unconnected with the armed conflict" who understand the needs of the region.
5 out of 10 representatives of non-government controlled territories will be chosen among IDPs and the other 5 will be those who still live on the uncontrolled territories, Yermak says. However, this notion is not reflected in the leaked document.
“We are talking about creating a platform where citizens living in a controlled and non-controlled territory can communicate about issues that are agreed in the Minsk agreement package,” said Yermak.
What Yermak is describing is a way of bringing to the table people who aren’t the self-appointed government of “LPR” and “DPR”, something the Zelenskyy team has been talking about for a while.
Critics say the Advisory council strengthens the claim to legitimacy of Russian-backed regimes, whose reps will gain equal negotiation status (now they formally are observers in the TCG; they call Nikonorova and Deiengo’s “plenipotentiary” titles a mistake.
But even critics say this step will not automatically legitimize the Russia-backed regimes. However, they think it’s an excessive concession. They point that such a crucial decision shouldn't have been adopted covertly; it wasn’t well communicated inside the president’s party.
Who in fact joins this council will determine whether it’s a sign of direct negotiations with “DPR” and “LPR” or a constructive idea to move forward in Minsk agreements.
For Russia, this council may be advantageous in promoting the idea of implementing the political components of Minsk (elections, special status) before the security components (Ukrainian control of the border, end to fighting withdrawal of weapons.
For Ukraine, this may be an important step in the search for acceptable and legitimate representatives of the uncontrolled territories.
Aside from the Council, the TCG reached other important decisions in their 11 Mar meeting. Sides agreed to finalize by 25 Mar. the lists of detainees on GCA and NGCA that needs to be released.
Sides are looking for a compromise on the new disengagement areas and considering the simultaneous opening of civilian checkpoints at Shchastya and Zolote, which would substantially improve freedom of movement.
Pics: scans of the TCG agreement on the council and protocol of the meeting as of 11 Mar. Source: zn.ua. Photo of Andriy Yermak, source: president.gov.ua. Photo of Dmitry Kozak, source: kremlin.ru.
English translation of the TCG agreement on the Advisory council made by my colleague @kquinnjudge. 
