2/19
Over the past two years the European Commission significantly improved its toolkit designed to enhance #RuleOfLaw & impose sanctions over Member States disregarding fundamental EU values.
3/19
The suspension of #ERRF/#RecoveryFund & the triggering of the #ConditionalityRegulation against Hungary’s government left the impression that the Commission drew its lessons from its decade long failure.
4/19
The suspension of the EUR 5.8 bn #RecoveryFund and the prospect of further EUR 7.5 bn financial penalties under the #ConditionalityRegulation started shaping 🇭🇺 governmental behaviour as early as June. And the #Orbán regime became increasingly cooperative, for good reasons
5/19
Hungarian state finances are in worse shape than in 2008-2009, the country's need for external funding is huge and imminent & gaining access to external funding is essential for the 🇭🇺 government to avoid a downgrading of its credit ratings and a potential mid-term #default.
6/19
While the Hungarian anti-corruption measures proposed to satisfy the @EU_Commission and convince it about scrapping the #ConditionalityRegulation procedure are barely satisfactory, based on the words of @JHahnEU ...
7/19
the @EU_Commission appreciates the efforts of the 🇭🇺 GOV and appears to be ready to close the conflict with a compromise if the #Orbán regime provides enough guarantees that may allegedly safeguard EU financial interests in Hungary from rampant political corruption
8/19
This approach of the @EU_Commission is understandable if one considers short-term realist arguments.
9/19
First, the Hungarian regime has already demonstrated that it is ready to block strategic European decisions with regard to #Russia, hence the European Commission may be reluctant to push #Orbán into a political war.
10/19
Second, the European Commission is definitely not interested in a Member State defaulting; thus, it has to keep the Hungarian economy afloat, which is severely limiting its policy options as well as the credibility of its threats vis-á-vis the #Orbán regime.
11/19
Third, even if the #Commission would be committed to playing hardball with Orbán and propose the suspension of EUR 7.5 bn to the @EUCouncil, it is uncertain whether Member States will let the Commission proposal fly or fail.
12/19
Following the outcomes of the #Italian elections, the resurrection of the Polish-Hungarian anti-EU alliance, and the continuous existence of Central European solidarity, the chances of imposing financial sanctions on #Hungary appear to be rather weak in the #Council.
13/19
What could the @EU_Commission do to avoid the accusations that it once again makes a foul compromise, giving-up real leverage over the Hungarian government for smoke and mirrors?
14/19
It should recognize that whatever is promised by Orbán with regard to the independence of the new #IntegrityAuthority, at the end of the day, the institution will operate in a politically deeply biased constitutional framework which will fundamentally determine its leeway.
15/19
Acceptable institutional guarantees can only be found outside of the Hungarian legal and constitutional system, at the level of the European Union.
16/19
Even if access to EU-funds cannot be legally conditioned to joining @EUProsecutor, the Commission should insist that — given the rule of law situation in #Hungary —
18/19
That could be a significant achievement on the @EU_Commission end and perhaps a real game changer regarding #Hungary’s #authoritarian track. Whether the Hungarian government is desperate enough to make this concession, is to be seen.
19/19
But without exploiting the opportunity offered by #EPPO and pushing the #OrbánRegime hard, the @EU_Commission is just heading once again to a bad compromise that will keep the EU’s non-democrats on a badly needed external lifeline
I had an interesting conversation on #Polish-#Hungarian relations yesterday under #ChathamHouse rule. I would like to share my key conclusion without further details. It will be highly disturbing from a #Polish perspective, but may contribute to a reflection process.
THREAD 1/15
2/15 #Polish foreign & security policy talks from an intellectual and moral high ground to previously more #Russia-friendly partners, especially #Germany, because PL & the Baltic states correctly predicted Russia's aggressive behaviour,
3/15
while #German & other Western European stakeholders were reluctant to give credit for their correct analysis. As disturbing this lessoning behaviour might be from a German perspective, history demonstrated that #Poland & Baltics have a better understanding of #Russia ...
3/11
Concerning the first one, the requirements of safe shipping through minefields and effective #CoastalDefense are not incompatible, and a mine-free shipping channel to #Odessa would not seriously compromise the port's defence against #Russian#amphibious operations.
2.
and the suspended #RecoveryFunds. #Orbán just repeats his strategy he pursued with success in case of the 2020 EU budget blockade.
He is aware of the fact that due to his rampage in EU politics he has lost nearly all of his persuasive and negotiation power,
3. hence he has to operate with coercion. This is not the first time #Hungary is taking EU decision making as hostage, and not even the last one if #Orbán once again is allowed to succeed with his #blackmailing.
2/12
As I argued a couple of days ago, the transfer of Soviet-era air superiority fighters from #NATO stocks could be an important symbolic move, but they are not the ideal #airdefence assets under the given circumstances. Arguments below 👇
3/12 #Ukrainian ground based #airdefence systems have been really successful over the past 13 days. Even if the transfer of fighter planes is a no go, SAM systems with #Russian origin still in service in NATO countries could be potentially delivered to #Ukraine. @ukraine_world
2/4 There appears to be a growing pattern that #Orbán allies look for investment opportunities in the high-tech end of the international defence & security sector. (See the case of #AeroVodochody and its Hungarian investors) reuters.com/article/uk-aer…
3/4 While acquiring lucrative foreign investments (which the seriously indebted #Spacecom is not) might be a logical strategy for a #corrupt#RentSeeking elite, like the circles of #Orbán, there is definitely more behind this story.
What is in the background of the #Lega-#PiS fallout?
THREAD 1/6 #Lega is divided on the question what should be the party's future direction. There is a growing support for heading to #EPP, which puts pressure on @matteosalvinimi, who is otherwise very pragmatic in this question.
2/6 So #Salvini has more options and leeway than his #RadicalRight counterparts, but he also needs palpable results what he can present for his constituency. #Lega
3/6 Allegedly there was an agreement between #Lega & #PiS (or at least that was Lega's communication in the 🇮🇹 media) that #PiS and some of its #ECR allies will join #ID, and that will be the formal and procedural way to forge a single new #RadicalRight political group in the 🇪🇺.