At Conference of Disarmament in Geneva yday, #Russia slightly more conciliatory on #NewSTART:
-"Important" that treaty continues to operate
-This fact means its parties "share an understanding of the risks emanating from a situation of strategic uncertainty and unpredictability"
-#NewSTART "keeps a window of opportunity open" for continued dialogue on strategic stability, with a focus on developing a possible agreement to replace it.
-US-RUS understandings reached in Geneva (2021) "retain the potential for the resumption and development of a comprehensive and substantive dialogue on future arms control, incl. involving all key players."
-Though US-RUS consultations have been frozen (due to the US' fault), "sooner or later" we will still have to work out a new global “security equation”
-We once again declare that we will be ready to listen to "common sense ideas" by our US colleagues
/1 RUS embassy in Germany: The decision will bring “permanent escalation”, “battle tanks with German crosses will again be sent to the ‘eastern front’ which will inevitably lead to the deaths of not only Russian soldiers, but also the civilian population” aljazeera.com/news/2023/1/25…
/2 Maria Zakharova on her Telegram account: the German decision confirms that this is a “pre-planned war” against #Russia
Not making headlines, the @OPCW Executive Council is in session this week.
Despite zero progress in clarification on the #Navalny poisoning - with #Russia issuing denials & accusations - #Western states seem to have decided NOT to up the ante vis-a-vis Russia at this time..(1/5)
Looking at statements issued at the Council this week, many - US, UK, Finland, Romania, Latvia, Germany, etc - recall #Navalny poisoning & bemoan lack of #Russian cooperation to date,...(2/5)
..but there seems to be no push to escalate the issue (ie. initiate procedures similar to those that led to #Syria's suspension from #OPCW last year).
I wonder why.
Desire not to further add to pile of problems with #Russia? Keep minimum engagement in multilateral fora? (3/5)
On #OPEC cuts: Narrative that "Saudi is screwing us (i.e. West) on oil" is part of the problem - as seen by many in the #MiddleEast.
They resent expectation that #Saudi "should help" keep prices low to a) mitigate fallout of #RussiaUkraineWar & b) cater to US domestic politics.
We may disagree, but do well to understand where they're coming from more broadly:
Since Feb, a reluctance in Gulf capitals (& elsewhere in #MiddleEast) to take action "with" the West "against" Russia in #RussiaUkraineWar (join sanctions, pump more oil) has had multiple layers:
1. A perception that the war is not “theirs” + a tendency to view it as fuelled in part by US/#NATO actions vis Russia (rather than as a Russian war of aggression against #Ukraine).
Unlike in the #West, the war does not register as a test for a “rules-based international order”
As a result of 1) Turkey successfully mediating grain exports from Ukraine ports & 2) #Russia increasingly shunning traditional mediation platforms (Geneva),
Turkey is poised to become chief intermediary on operational issues re #RussiaUkraineWar un.org/en/black-sea-g… (3/18)
Yday, #Lavrov’s confirmation in #Cairo that #Russia seeks to “help the Ukrainian people to free themselves” from their regime gained - understandably -considerable attention in Western capitals.
But it might obscure other important aspects of #Lavrov’s visit to #Egypt. A 🧵1/14
But #Lavrov's engaged the Arabs extensively since Feb, visiting Algeria, Oman, Bahrain, Saudi. He also hosted other Arab FMs in Moscow
Now Egypt, where he also engaged the League of Arab States 2/14
This effort to engage evenly – Iran, Turkey, Israel, Arabs – is a long-standing feature of #Russia’s MENA policy, but will become more important in light of Western #sanctions.
Losing further friends would be costly, even in a region that’s of 2ndary importance to #Russia. 3/14
Pushing back against Russia thus 1) takes extra effort & 2) is of strategic importance beyond #Ukraine (1/11)
For proof that #Russia is not isolated, look toward big parts of Asia, LatAm, Africa, Middle East. Voting patterns at #UNGA. Who hasn’t joint sanctions against #Russia. How media beyond the "West" reports on the war in #Ukraine. And most of all: Look at #China and #India. (2/11)
Let’s take #MiddleEast: Sure, there’s few staunch supporters of #Russia (Syria). Most "sit on the fence": Reluctant to join sanctions; Saudis/UAE won't pump more oil; Even #NATO ally (!) #Turkey & closest US ally #Israel tread cautiously due to security concerns vis Russia (3/11)