At the same time Pompeo is meeting w/ Pyongyang, we ought to have an eyes wide open view of what is going on here. The handwriting is on the wall: the admin is simply not prepared for negotiations with the Kim regime. Pompeo is under pressure from his own colleagues, and... (1)
...his boss is spouting off at the mouth, talking as if the whole North Korean nuclear problem is solved and that he will soon be awarded the Nobel. Pompeo is in an unenviable position. We should all wish him well. But it’s not looking good, for several reasons. (2)
First, the June 12 Singapore statement was bare bones. A 5th grader could have drafted it. The statement is not a “deal” as Trump keeps saying, but an overrated press statement that puts promises down on paAnalysts much smarter than I have beaten this point to death. (3)
Second, if Kim Jong-un is truly interested in CVID, he has an odd way of showing it. Leaked intel reports of improvements at Yongbyon, a missile production plant, and nuclear fuel prod at secret enrichment plants are not exactly encouraging. This is typical NK behavior (4)
All of this nuclear activity could be an effort to enhance North Korea’s leverage at the negotiating table. Or it could be an obvious sign that Pyongyang is as willing to agree to CVID as they were during the Clinton, Bush & Obama admins. I put my $ on the latter (5)
Thirdly, North Korea is a de-facto nuclear state, which means that the U.S. will have to offer the moon, the stars & everything in between if CVID is to be even remotely viable. The problem is that there are just some things a U.S. president can’t give up (U.S.-SK allnc) (6)
Only one country in world history has built a nuclear stockpile before deciding to unilaterally disarm it. That was South Korea toward the end of Apartheid, when Pretoria was looking to ingratiate itself w/ the West as it transitioned to democracy. NK is not South Africa! (7)
Finally, North Korea is an inherently paranoid state suspicious of its neighbors. It’s the weakest country in Northeast Asia with U.S. troops/assets to its south and east. U.S. assurances to Pyongyang are worth nothing. Nukes are the great equalizer & ultimate deterrent. (8)
Hard truth: if Pompeo & Co stick w/ CVID, diplomacy w/ the North will collapse. It might take a few weeks or a few months, but there are too many q’s over verification & too many differences in principle for these talks to produce what Washington is hoping for: a non-nuke NK (9)
As I see it, the only way diplomacy succeeds is if the U.S. ditches CVID & lowers the bar to a more pragmatic objective: partial nuke dismantlement; permanent prohibition on more nuke proliferation/military R&D/fuel production; a strict, expansive IAEA inspection regime...(10)
...permanent nuke/ICBM/Inter-mediate range testing freeze; NK signing of the Test Ban Treaty, NPT, AP. North Korea will be expected to significantly downsize rather than eliminate its nuclear program. And Kim would be able to retain some nukes for deterrence purposes. (11)
Granted, this type of deal would be hammered in DC as Chamberlain-esque. It would have a hell of a time getting ratified. And Trump would have to admit he failed on CVID like his predecs. But btw this less-grandiose plan & an unrestrained NK, this option doesn’t look too bad (12)
