Thread by @hayward_katy

Who isn’t fed up of the #Brexit hell-on-wheels show?
We want certainty, agreement, realism... In fact, we need compromise!

Could the #MalthouseCompromise be the olive branch that shows sign of dry land on the distant horizon? 🕊️
(I'm thinking esp of you, @BorderIrish)
1/15

The Malthouse Compromise involves 2 Plans.
Plan A: limit transition to Dec 2021 & then go to ‘A Better Deal’.
Plan B: have a quasi transition period & prepare for WTO rules kicking in on 1 Jan 2021.
The choice is clear for the EU, right?
Except…
2/15
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…it’s not.
Because the #MalthouseCompromise really doesn’t meet the challenges that the Protocol in the Withdrawal Agreement tries to meet.

Let’s remember the purpose of the Protocol:

3/15

‘To set out arrangements necessary to address
* the unique circumstances on the island of Ireland,
* maintain the necessary conditions for continued North-South cooperation,
* avoid a hard border and
* protect the 1998 Agreement in all its dimensions’.

4/15

Can the Malthouse Compromise pass muster?
Well, its Plan B is a dead-end.
WTO rules with no Withdrawal Agreement means a customs & regulatory @BorderIrish, with no protection for the 1998 Agreement or cross-border cooperation.
#whoops

5/15

Plan A is more interesting.
It too has an immovable deadline of end Dec 2021. This is intended to focus minds.

But all it really means is that the cliff edge is nudged 2.5 years hence, with no safety net below.

6/15

It would replace the Protocol with ‘A Better Deal’.
This is a Free Trade Agreement, i.e. flimsy connections to the EU,
But yet relying a great deal on special status of UK as may have been gathered thru' 45 years of membership
[*cough* let’s just forget about the past 3]
7/15

Essential point to be aware of:
The Malthouse Compromise wants the UK out of the Customs Union, Single Market and ‘all EU rule-making’.

This means that the level playing field that currently enables frictionless movement of goods across EU borders no longer applies.

8/15

Hence what it proposes for @BorderIrish:
Union Customs Code applies, with customs declarations, technical checks, random checks, inspections on premises.
Its concession to avoiding a hard border? To have checks away from borderline & to 'promise' no physical infrastructure.
9/15

'A Better Deal' #MalthouseCompromise promises to 'deploy advanced customs & trade facilitation measures which include specific solutions for the Irish border.'

What these specific solutions amount to, when it comes down to it, is turning a blind eye.
10/15

To be effective, #MalthouseCompromise requires many things that'll be far more difficult outside EU: inc.
inter-agency coop & info sharing 📤📥
recog. of the other party’s inspections & certification of conformity 🧾
simplified & expedited procedures;
mutual recognition...
11/15

Remember this all relies on “Self-assessment for importers to declare imports periodically & account for duties payable...”

Why would importers take on the additional costs entailed when there's almost no chance those who don’t bother would get caught?
🦹‍♂️
12/15

In sum: the Malthouse Compromise wd possibly be worth considering if:
(a) it was prior to triggering Art 50,
(b) avoiding a hard border only meant avoiding physical infrastructure at the border,
(c) the new customs declaration system of the UK was on target for delivery...
13/15

(d) it wasn’t intended for the unique context of post-1998 Agreement Northern Ireland/Ireland*

*P.S. THIS IS THE MOST IMPORTANT POINT

14/15

No mention of VAT.
Mentions of @BelfastAgmt & N/S coop copied & pasted from #Protocol.
Flimsy on the CTA.
I admit ‘A Better Deal’ is m.more appealing title than 'The Protocol on NI/IRL’.
But this doc is designed to get an agreement within the Tory party, not with the EU.

15/15