Thread by @Usherwood

Here's an effort to map out how the EU sees the Brexit options and why it might think the UK isn't being realistic right now

1/

Massively reductive, I know, but let's plot out a space.

The higher up an option, the more benefits it has. Note there's a lot more space below the line than above.

I'm including economic and political elements here

2/

Importantly, this is going to be How Things Are, but rather How The EU Thinks Thing Are, which is an important distinction.

How you see the world matters in how you interact with the world

3/

Right now, the EU thinks things are pretty good, in that membership is A Good Thing, for both parties. Yes, there are costs, but they are much outweighed by the benefits.

That's part of why it struggled with the desire to leave

4/

All options past membership are worse than membership, for the EU, because only it ensures the maximum level of interaction and representation

5/

Even the "membership minus" of the transition included in the Withdrawal Agt is worse, because it challenges the notions of representation that are a key part of the treaties.

It's tolerable in the short-run, but not beyond (even before we get into the treaty basis issue)

6/

Likewise, the EU thinks transition isn't ideal for the UK, because of representation and because it knows this is a hard sell for a UK gvt wanting to show exit is meaningful

7/

But at least transition is time-bound, so it's only going to be an interlude.

So what next?

Oh yes...

8/

Absent an agreement otherwise, it's backstop time.

This is worse than the transition, because a substantial amount of cooperation falls away, plus there's that UK-wide TCA, which the EU really doesn't like (but which the UK insisted on)

9/

As such, the backstop is seen as sub-optimal for both sides, but with the UK getting a substantial concession, which must be to its advantage (hence it's slightly higher placing)

10/

This might make more sense if we consider that the intention of the backstop is to cover any gap between the end of transition and the entry into force of a new treaty on future relations (the "Future Partnership")

11/

Since this is going to be a basis of long-term on-going interactions, it must be better than the backstop (cos even the EU knows the backstop's not popular), but it's not going to be nearly as extensive as the transition (which is everything)

12/

However, the notion is that in the long-run, you're trending back to a least-worst outcome (since it's still not membership).

And since that benefit is pretty symmetric, the UK should be heading there too

13/

But what's this to do with no-deal?

Well, how the EU sees no-deal affects its actions on these other elements

14/

No-deal is A Bad Thing, in the EU's eyes.

And it's bad for all parties.

15/

It's bad for the EU, because it'll be a failure to maintain a working relationship with the UK and a loss of an important market

16/

However, it'll be very much worse for the UK, because the economic impact will be very much bigger, the political destabilisation will be substantial and the UK's capacity to manage 3rd-state relations will be much compromised

17/

Thus, for the EU, no-deal is a problem for everyone, but it's very, very much more a problem for the UK

18/

If you accept this one-dimensional view (and I'd understand if you didn't), then the EU views the current position as bizarre

19/

The UK appears to be working towards the worst possible outcome, rejecting path to the least-worst outcome, even as it talks about its desire to follow that path (to a future partnership)

20/

If there's a working assumption of rationality, then UK must either have a radically-different view of costs/benefits (that the EU can't appreciate), or its words aren't that sincere

21/

Absent any articulation of cost/benefit from the new PM (pluck doesn't count), the rational position is to keep offering the current proposition, because it's less-worse than no-deal

22/

Given the slender Commons majority, and the general precariousness of the situation, why not wait to see if the UK folds/changes position by itself?

23/

The only alternative route is that the UK comes up with a proposal to recast the backstop/WA into a form that meets both its domestic needs and those of the EU.

But there's no sign of that happening

24/

And it will be the UK's role to start that alternative, for the reason set out at the top of this thread: all outcomes are worse than membership, so why facilitate that?

25/

In sum

/end