Thread by @ambassadorbrief

Weekly Geopolitical Brief

Three stories:

Saudi oil plant attacked: Saudi Arabia’s oil production has been temporarily cut in half after an attack on Abqaiq – the world’s biggest crude processing plant. Details are still emerging about the relative roles of the Houthis & Iran.

.@ilangoldenberg argued that this attack is a big deal – much more significant than the tanker attacks. He’s “skeptical it was just the Houthis” & “wouldn’t be surprised if there was a direct Iranian hand”. Times like this, it would be nice to be able to trust this admin’s word.

The US’ response is not yet clear. Trump initially tweeted that the US is “locked & loaded”. But in a subsequent Tweet he pivoted to boasting that the US is a “net energy exporter” and “we don’t need Middle Eastern Oil”. But he noted the US will “help our Allies”.

Reading the Trump Tweet tea leaves, @MichaelSinghDC argued this “appears to imply that the US will not respond to the Abqaiq attack, but will support Saudi Arabia if it chooses to respond. Also implies that the US has no vital interests at stake”.

.@KateKizer argued that these attacks are a logical product of the escalating Yemen civil war – which the US has “actively fanned the flames of”. To stop them, the answer is to “engage in some actual diplomacy to try to end the war”.

Bolton Out: @thomaswright08 argued that Bolton’s departure signals the closing of the chapter marked “Militarism and Maximum Pressure” and the opening of one called “Dealmaking and the Pursuit of the Nobel Peace Prize”.

Going forward, Wright continued, Trump “wants a summit with Iran’s leaders and deals with the Taliban, Kim Jong Un, and Vladimir Putin on arms control. He does not care about most of the details, as long as he gets the credit”.

Bullied by Beijing: per Reuters, Australia “determined China was responsible for a cyber-attack on its national parliament & three largest political parties…in May”. But it kept that determination secret, “in order to avoid disrupting trade relations with Beijing”.

.@FergusHanson argued that “it's a shame to have the attribution of the attack out via a media leak again”. This follows the same approach as used in other cases of Chinese hacking. But, he noted, this approach “won’t do much” to deter another attack.

.@nktpnd argued if this is how US allies make decisions when economic self-interest is pitted against national security concerns, then there's a deep rot setting in. @BaldingsWorld added: there is literally nothing China can’t do that people won't just pretend didn't happen.

Three thought-provoking articles:

.@stephenWalt argued that the cold, hard reality is that the U.S. lost the Afghanistan war. All we are debating now—whether in talks with the Taliban or in op-ed pages back home—is the size and shape of the fig leaf designed to conceal a major strategic failure.

He continued, the taproot of the problem is the enormous difficulty of the sort of large-scale social engineering the U.S. was attempting in a country so very, very different from it. Trying to turn Afghanistan into a Western-style democracy was an act of extraordinary hubris.

And part of the problem was “a long series of commanders kept promising success, instead of telling the commander-in-chief that they had been given an assignment that wasn’t necessary and that they could not accomplish at a reasonable cost”.

The Washington Post Editorial Board argued that “Chinese diplomats in the West are decrying the souring of U.S.-China relations…but China’s Communist rulers cannot behave with barbarity and secrecy, and simultaneously expect to enjoy the world’s respect”.

The Board cited the case of Tashpolat Teyip, an Uighur Professor, who was President of Xinjiang University from 2010 until 2017. In 2017, Professor Teyip was disappeared by the CCP. The CCP has sentenced the Professor to death, and he’s now awaiting his execution.

.@thomaswright08 argued that progressive Presidential candidates have “signaled their desire to pursue a policy in which the US reduces its military commitments overseas…The interesting question, though, is whether that is possible at an acceptable cost”.

Wright continued, “outside of the Middle East, the answer is almost certainly no…They would have to make major sacrifices on alliances, nuclear proliferation, and spheres of influence that no Democratic Commander in Chief seems likely to want to make”.

Three events to watch in the near future:

(Another) Russian reset? Per the FT, “France's Foreign Minister has hailed “a new state of mind” in relations between Russia & Ukraine and called for the end of distrust between the Kremlin and the rest of Europe, but stopped short of suggesting [lifting] EU sanctions on Moscow”.

.@PatPorter76 argued that Russia’s convergence with China makes some kind of settlement with Russia (as opposed to a superficial reset) increasingly important to try. It’s preferable to “fatalism and permanent, dangerous rivalry”.

Israeli Election rerun, two: per Stratfor, “on Sept. 17, in what is likely to be a narrowly decided contest, [Netanyahu’s] Likud party will try to hold off a serious challenge by former Israel Defense Forces chief Benny Gantz of the Blue and White party to maintain power”.

They continued, “to do so, Netanyahu has promised to annex much of the West Bank…The annexation…would mark a major change in the international order, after decades of diplomacy aimed to avoid a precedent that military conquest could change borders”.

Iran diplomacy? Per @ntabrizy, rumours swirled that Bolton’s firing was a precondition to a Trump-Rouhani meeting on the sidelines of the UN. However, per @haaretzcom, an Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson said Sunday that “such a meeting will not take place”.

.@fareedzakaria argued that with Bolton gone, Trump has the opportunity to act on his instincts & actually get something done — a new Iran deal. Iran will not simply surrender. But it might agree to a new deal that achieves more than the Obama accord.

@FareedZakaria Fareed continued, “for this to work, Trump will have to overrule some of his most hawkish advisers and find a path to a real negotiation…Trump's goal should be to get the Iranians to extend the time horizon of key parts of the deal by approximately five years”.

Thanks as always to everyone who has been liking, retweeting, and spreading the word. We are continually humbled by the following we are gathering amongst the world’s leading diplomats, journalists, and thinkers.

Have a great week!

The Ambassador’s Brief Editors