Thread by @ambassadorbrief

Weekly Geopolitical Brief

Three stories:

Chinese foothold in Iran: per @PetroleumEcon, China has agreed to invest $400b in Iran’s petroleum sector & transport infrastructure. And protecting China’s investment will be 5,000 Chinese security personnel.

China’s $400b investment is an unfortunate “I told you so” moment for many who have, like @stephenWalt, been arguing that Trump’s “white whale of so-called maximum pressure against Iran…can only push Iran ever closer to Beijing [and Moscow]”.

.@NeilQuilliam1 and @SanamVakil argued last year that Trump’s Iran policy leaves Russia and China with “an opening to deepen their own engagement”, and potentially gain leverage to “manipulate” Iran – with “unknown consequences for regional stability”.

.@jricole argued that “Iran would rather have had this deal with Europe, but Trump…slapped severe sanctions on Tehran, and has been bullying big European firms into joining the financial blockade. Iran had to seek its economic future with China, whether it likes it or not”.

Cole continued: China’s security presence in Iran “will be as big as the US military footprint in today’s Iraq”. It is likely meant as a deterrent to US adventurism: any major US action against Iran would risk hitting Chinese personnel & spiking tensions with a nuclear power”.

Afghanistan “peace process” chaos: The US Special Rep for Afghanistan announced a tentative US-Taliban deal: 5,400 troops would be withdrawn from Afghanistan within 135 days, in return for the Taliban meeting conditions – including providing counterterrorism reassurances.

But then, per the NYT, “after staying out of the details…Trump suddenly wanted to be the dealmaker…or at least perceived to be”. So he embraced the idea of trying to expand the deal at Camp David. Then he abruptly cancelled, citing a Taliban attack.

.@paul_salem & @georgetownprof argued that a US withdrawal would most likely lead to a renewed bout of internal fighting, which neither the Taliban nor the Afghan government is likely to win. The prospects of real accommodation between those two sides appear remote.

.@WonkVJ argued that “the farce” is that the US doesn’t need a “peace plan” to pull out of Afghanistan. And in all likelihood it wouldn't be credible anyway. The US does however need to red-team a withdrawal decision so that it can manage the consequences.

HK bill withdrawn: after Carrie Lam announced the withdrawal of the HK extradition bill, the NYT reported that there are “hints of unease in China’s leadership” over how Xi has misread “the scope of the discontent in Hong Kong, which is only growing”.

The NYT continued, “Beijing has been slow to adapt to events”, offering “partial concession[s] that reflected the party’s hard-line instincts … & fueled even larger protests”. Further, CCP leaders have agreed “not [to] intervene forcefully, at least for now” and wait it out.

.@tombschrader argued that “HK's unique legal status as a financial portal between the PRC and the outside world almost certainly makes it a key hub in elite PRC patronage networks. If [they] crack down hard, [they] lose that lever in [their] internal political struggles”.

Three thought-provoking articles:

Minxin Pei argued that China's capacity to threaten America’s global leadership will be severely constrained by (i) its inefficient state-capitalist system (ii) rapid demographic aging (iii) powerful rivals like India & Japan & (iv) domestic forces challenging the rule of the CCP

He continued: as long as the U.S. maintains a robust alliance with other democracies, it can safely confront…China…The only existential threat to American security…is climate change” – and on this issue, the US can’t afford to let competition with China spoil co-operation.

.@HalBrands argued that “while diplomacy is an indispensable complement to military power, it rarely works well as a substitute…U.S. military power, and its perceived willingness to use that power, profoundly shapes what can be obtained at the negotiating table”.

...“In the Indo-Pacific, the U.S. ability to negotiate favorable deals with China, or simply to keep regional allies & partners on our side, will be critically influenced not simply by the creativity of American diplomats but by the strength of the hard power that supports them”.

.@Scholars_Stage argued the US military bases in Japan are sitting ducks. In a conflict with China, the first wave of precision missiles would arrive in 6-9 minutes. These would crater runways, leaving US aircraft powerless on the ground –to be destroyed in the next missile wave.

He continued: wargames consistently show “tens of billions of dollars in [US] military equipment gone in less than 30 minutes of fighting”. The issue is that “the F-35 rules the sky when it’s in the sky, but it gets killed on the ground in large numbers.”

The solution, he argued, is to better disperse the US military assets in Japan – using the “more than 100 possible sites” that would be suitable. Operating out of a few dense hubs is no longer viable. In the age of long-range precision munitions, “dispersal means survival”.

Three events to watch in the near future:

Brexit: Per @A_Sloat, last week was another dramatic one as Parliament—facing an imminent five-week suspension as the clock ticks towards the Oct 31 deadline—seized control of the agenda, introduced legislation to prevent a no-deal Brexit, & blocked early elections.

She continued: it was a stunning series of defeats for Prime Minister Boris Johnson, who lost his one-seat parliamentary majority when a MP defected, then expelled 21 MPs from his party for voting against him, and finally saw his own brother quit as Tory MP & minister.

And @A_Sloat ’s latest guidance: British Parliament is expected to be suspended at the end of business today. The anti no deal bill will pass, but the second attempt to force a mid-October election reportedly wont.

European stimulus: The ECB is expected to announce a significant stimulus package on Thursday. But, argued @LucreziaReichli, negative interest rates & quantitative easing “cannot by themselves address the pervasive risk aversion holding back the eurozone economy”.

@LucreziaReichli She continued, “Eurozone policymakers must, therefore, find the political will to design a comprehensive package of financial and fiscal measures aimed at injecting new energy into the European project”.

US-India trade deal? per Inside US Trade, The Trump Admin is looking to demonstrate that it can seal trade victories. And Trump wants to sign a deal with Modi as soon as the UN General Assembly – which runs from September 17-30.

Per Stratfor, “this would mark a big shift, considering New Delhi's struggle to even nail down a meeting [earlier]”. Further, “it could reveal growing political pressure on Trump to show trade wins, which would be good news for other potential targets like Vietnam”.

Thanks as always to everyone who has been liking, retweeting, and spreading the word. We are continually humbled by the following we are gathering amongst the world’s leading diplomats, journalists, and thinkers.

Have a great week!

The Ambassador’s Brief Editors