Distrusting individuals demand more governmental regulation but less government redistribution.
Magnificent paper by Charron, Harring & @VictorLapuente which confirms some of the hypotheses developed by @hamandcheese and @willwilkinson (@NiskanenCenter).
onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.111…
Magnificent paper by Charron, Harring & @VictorLapuente which confirms some of the hypotheses developed by @hamandcheese and @willwilkinson (@NiskanenCenter).
onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.111…
📉 Countries with low levels of trust such as Mexico or Turkey are highly interventionist when it comes to defining labor relations, opening hours, and economic regulations but less keen on redistribution of income through taxation.
📈 Governments in high-trust countries such as Denmark, Finland, and Sweden intervene relatively little in the area of regulation, giving freedom to their economic agents to innovate, but do intervene in the area of redistribution.
The link between high trust, low regulation and high redistribution is weak in European regions with poor quality of government.
It's in well-governed regions that high-trusting individuals develop strong preferences for both redistributive policies & free market deregulation.
It's in well-governed regions that high-trusting individuals develop strong preferences for both redistributive policies & free market deregulation.
To sum up,
⬇ High institutional quality
⬇ High civicness & social trust
⬇ Less regulation, more redistribution
Extractive institutions prevent the development of 'The Free-Market Welfare State' paradigm developed by @hamandcheese (i.e. Spain).
niskanencenter.org/blog/the-free-…
⬇ High institutional quality
⬇ High civicness & social trust
⬇ Less regulation, more redistribution
Extractive institutions prevent the development of 'The Free-Market Welfare State' paradigm developed by @hamandcheese (i.e. Spain).
niskanencenter.org/blog/the-free-…
