I will be tweeting today from the twenty-second Stockholm China Forum. The sessions are all under the Chatham House rule but I will have snippets from the discussions (none of which represent my own views). General background on the forum here: gmfus.org/forum/stockhol… #SCF22
On the US-China trade war, we go through negotiations, we make compromises, most people on the two sides expect us to reach an agreement; the technology war is worse: there is no negotiation, the US doesn’t want to talk to China at all. We see it as decoupling, containment #SCF22
Even as the UK leaves the EU, on issues such as China we find ourselves closer and closer to the EU position than ever – and China is likely to be an issue where, at points, we choose a different approach to the US #SCF22
on 5G, if we think we’ve done the technical competence work and the national security competence work, we don’t want a public shouting match with our closest allies. The underlying principles and analysis are not necessarily different but we may make different choices #SCF22
Points of agreement among Democrat presidential candidates on differences in China policy vs current administration – more multilateralism; more on democratic values as a comparative advantage; more room for cooperation with China on issues such as climate #SCF22
We Chinese took a lesson from trade and tech war that we depend on the US too much – we have to put an end to that as soon as possible. It includes market, technology, even education. Decoupling is increasingly the intention of both countries, it's taking place already #SCF22
It is not only the US – most of the major US maritime allies take a hard line towards China’s technological emergence. China mostly wants to influence the powers in continental Europe that haven’t decided. This maritime / continental divide will play out in areas too. #SCF22
On trade, while overall trade cooperation - TTIP, TPP - is difficult for the US, even among Dems, the digital area is different: a EU-US-Japan-Oz digital trade agreement might be possible in the next administration #SCF22
Competition with China is at the crossroads of security, technology & values; China is exporting its own digital model which doesn’t coincide with ours– on data, surveillance, social control. We need to promote “our model” but for that, US / EU have to get on the same page #SCF22
There is still a huge imbalance of power between the Chinese system and democratic countries collectively – the democracies represent 65% of global GDP. The question is whether they can actually work together. #SCF22
Huawei is only the beginning of a thousand difficult choices for Europe. If the current US security doctrine hardens, US will try to get us out of tech rels w/China. We rely on US for security so will look at US framework if not with sympathy then at least with respect. #SCF22
The Belt and Road is achieving some of its objectives, to export some surplus domestic capabilities. But profitability is poor, and there is backlash in developing and western world. We are already going through strategic retrenchment for BRI. #SCF22
The Chinese armed forces will not participate in repressing even violent protestors in HK. We will not go in. HK special status is arguably even more important to us than before, given the US-China confrontation. #SCF22
Our (Chinese) government made its strategic assertions too quickly, too broadly, and with too much self-confidence. After all the rhetoric about globalization and opening and reform, recently we did nothing. #SCF22
In Xi’s recent speech, he mentions “struggle” 60 times in under 9 minutes. There is a strong sense that the international anti-China plot is thickening, there are plans to contain China left and right, and that the struggle will be uncompromising #SCF22
If a Chinese official today gave the speech on Hong Kong that Deng Xiaoping gave in 1984, he would be locked up #SCF22
China has had much more impressive attempts in the past to wrestle with hybrid identities and pluralism and these Chinese traditions are being lost – investigative journalists, lawyers, Chinese Muslim theologians #SCF22
18 months ago, if you were in Silicon Valley pitching a new facial recognition technology, people would throw money at you. Now people ask whether it will be used in Xinjiang. #SCF22
“Near-arctic state” is not a term that came from China, we took the term from a UK document #SCF22
Nordic countries and the US played the most important role in China becoming an observer at the Arctic Council, not Russia. The interest from Russia in China’s involvement is as a partner for the Northern Sea Route and LNG. #SCF22
Competition for harbors, airports, and who owns them, is part of the competition in the Arctic. So is who masters the icebreakers and the ice. US has one, Russia has fifty, China is constructing new nuclear-powered ones. #SCF22
If we [China] try to avoid talking about “geopolitics” with the Arctic, we’ll make the same mistake as with the Belt and Road, pretending that what we’re doing there has nothing to do with geopolitics and no-one believes you #SCF22
Before the Crimea annexation, Russia wanted to push China away from the Arctic. Sanctions changed that. Russia also wants support for exploration of the Arctic – resource demand, technology, infrastructure - and China can provide that. #SCF22
The conventional DC view on China Russia ten years ago was the Bobo Lo version – an axis of convenience. There’s been a sea-change in the assessment. Now an understanding that the two countries are cooperating in important ways that are problematic for western interests #SCF22
Main concerns for the US: the Sino-Russian mil relationship – regional security cooperation, arms sales, joint exercises. PLA learn things from joint exercises with Russia – about war-fighting – that they can’t get from any other military. #SCF22
Sino-Russian tech cooperation also a concern – industrial, scientific and technology; Huawei intends to recruit a thousand Russian specialists in the next five years, skilled engineers, mathematicians. Given civ-mil fusion will have implications on the military side. #SCF22
Russia, before jumping into China’s arms, said: traditional western partners are part of the sanctions coalition; who else can provide markets, technology? Only China. But what about the risks? Commissioned studies, analyzed them and became less concerned. #SCF22
On arms, Russia had stopped selling high-end weapons. But China will be there without us. So we have a 10-yr window in which to sell this kit. And India, Vietnam etc. will knock on Moscow’s door and ask for the same systems. This is exactly what’s happening with S-400s and Su-35s
China has great skill in massaging the Russian ego – China’s leader always takes the first trip to Russia, never talks about “junior partner” or “big brother” #SCF22
Next phase of Sino-Russian military cooperation will be joint development of systems; Russia’s advantage is short-lived and we need to capitalize on that. Sharing of counterintelligence & intelligence. Likely joint hybrid operations– particularly in Balkans, SE Asia, maybe Africa
Russia is deeply moving into China’s pocket; but there is still a quarter that welcomes Macron’s outreach. We like that you see that we’re pushing us closer to China, but what’s on offer from the European side? Offer sounds to us like– you surrender, then we talk. #SCF22
Bobo Lo’s thesis on China and Russia was wrong for several reasons. The thesis ignored the possibility that a marriage of convenience can turn into a serious relationship. #SCF22
Xi recently made a brave promise of doubling Russia trade – this was a bit of a shock to China’s economic planners. #SCF22
How can China and Russia. cooperate on security in the whole Eurasian region? There are some proposals – to use CSTO / SCO. Russia is not interested. But China always wants to push the security cooperation side beyond counter-terrorism #SCF22
The old thing for Russia was – to pretend to pivot to Asia, then when it has the chance, it goes crawling back to Europe. That’s not happening anymore. This time it’s serious. #SCF22
The question about how Russia reacts to the BRI is not just about Central Asia, it’s about the Balkans, South Caucasus and other areas in Europe’s periphery. But actually there’s a fair degree of complementary there. #SCF22
For China, the reality of power is more important than the appearance of leadership, which also makes it easier to do the “massage Russia’s ego” thing effectively #SCF22
Russia used to be the size of Guangdong and will soon be the size of Hunan. China’s leverage is only going to grow – in technology, finance, and other economic means. #SCF22
Leadership change after Putin or broader change of the system after 2030 may mean leaders with different ideas about China. There are still people in the Russian system who think that China is a threat. Populist forces in Russia are also very anti-Chinese. #SCF22
Are there transactions with the West about China that Russia might make? Possibly. There’s not going to be a “drawing Russia back in the family” but there could be a “this is dangerous to our mutual interests, is there a deal?” set of exchanges #SCF22
What can Europe and the west do by way of pragmatic offer to Russia vis-à-vis China? The chances are very slim. Crimea will be there with us. You can work your way around Eastern Ukraine. Turning the page on election interference is difficult. #SCF22
On 5G and Huawei, disruption to cause regime change is the worry Russia has - the killer switch - not intelligence collection. Will the US do this? Likely. Will China? No. A hard calculation to change. #SCF22
Cooperation on counter-intelligence is already happening between China and Russia: when MSS cracked the CIA operation in China, they gave a briefing for the FSB #SCF22
It would be better if Europeans continued to see multilateralism as an end as well as a means, practiced as a virtue that can help medium-sized European countries to flourish. China has a version of this, which is: the tribute system “in its ideal form”. #SCF22
Some European officials have started to believe WTO is in worse shape than we ever thought, and that perhaps we have to think about creating a new institution. #SCF22
International law is a value in itself, the WTO isn’t a value in itself. Europeans and Americans increasingly think that the institution is not able to deal with a large non-market actor like China. We may have to create alternative arrangements with like-minded players #SCF22
“We cannot push China on strategic issues because we need to cooperate on climate change” is wrongheaded – it’s in China’s interest to deal with this too, China is not a “winner” from climate change, we shouldn’t fall into this trap #scf22
US may have abdicated from the multilateral efforts on climate but you look at what’s actually happening: Germany is flat, US emissions went down, China has gone up every year #scf22
That’s the last from #SCF22 – and just the usual reminder that all the above tweets are me paraphrasing from the various participants in the forum, they’re not my personal views, as their internal contradictions and claims of various nationalities should make clear...
