Thread by @Ali_Wyne

THREAD: Mel Leffler's new piece for @TheAtlantic is probably the most compelling short-form rejoinder I've seen to the conclusion that contemporary tensions between the United States and China amount or are akin to a new Cold War.

theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/…

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Another essential rebuttal, though a bit longer, is @OAWestad's essay in the September/October 2019 issue of @ForeignAffairs, "The Sources of Chinese Conduct: Are Washington and Beijing Fighting a New Cold War?"

foreignaffairs.com/articles/china…

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I want to highlight two observations Professor Leffler makes that I haven't seen articulated in other appraisals of the analogy (please correct me if I'm mistaken!).

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First: "Present challenges come not after 30 years of global war and depression, but after 30 years of peace among the great powers, economic growth...and substantial poverty eradication (especially in countries like China and India)."

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Second (many thanks to my colleague @CarolineCBaxter for flagging): "During the Cold War, the United States took actions—such as the Marshall Plan and the reconstruction of West Germany—that could be justified on their own terms, for reasons other than containment."

[5/11]

The phrase "could be justified on their own terms" is essential, and I wish Professor Leffler had had room to elaborate.

It suggests a question that should focus U.S. policymakers' and observers' minds:

[6/11]

What foreign policy actions can the United States take that can be justified on their own terms, for reasons other than challenging China's further resurgence?

[7/11]

One might object that there's nothing intrinsically unstrategic about a foreign policy that's oriented around America's principal competitor; indeed, what else besides that competitor could and/or should be the foundation of that policy?

[8/11]

My initial responses would be two.

First, unless one believes that the challenges from China will endure in perpetuity, Washington will only be able to advance its national interests so far if it defines its foreign policy primarily in opposition to Beijing.

[9/11]

Second, should the imperative of contesting China largely determine U.S. foreign policy, instead of serving, more modestly, as just one pillar (a major one, of course) of an affirmative agenda, Washington will find it difficult to proceed with strategic clarity.

[10/11]

Anxiety that's tethered to a broader strategic vector can be an extraordinary instrument of self-renewal. In a vacuum, though, it's far more likely to impede one's vision.

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