Thread by @yarbatman

1. Trump skipped @wef in 2019. Apparently, as a condition of the U.S. president's participation at Davos this year, WEF changed the terms of @JZarif's invitation so as to make sure Iran's foreign minister did not attend. This thread explains why...
bourseandbazaar.com/news-1/2020/1/…

2. Last summer, the Trump administration designated Zarif under a terrorism authority. I can't see how the admin would have tolerated sharing a platform with an individual they have sanctioned as a terrorist. @borgebrende and team were likely pressured by the admin on this point.

3. There is a genuine question of whether @wef would be exposed to U.S. secondary sanctions by giving a platform to a person the U.S. deems a "terrorist." The usual exemptions that permit Government of Iran participation in such events don't apply under terrorism designations.

4. While a Swiss entity, and therefore not subject to the EU blocking regulation prohibiting compliance with U.S. secondary sanctions, @wef should be expected to ignore the extraterritorial nature of such prohibitions. They are inconsistent with European and Swiss interests.

5. As Iranian foreign ministry spokesman @SAMOUSAVI9 has stated, Zarif's absence at #WEF20 is a "missed opportunity for dialogue." It is consistent with the @wef mission for a figure like Zarif and a figure like Trump to share a platform and address the same global audience.

5. But perhaps @wef's more immediate mission was to get Trump (and a delegation led by Treasury Secretary Mnuchin) to show up—promising a triumphal return to the Davos stage. If that is the case, Zarif's participation would have been an obvious sticking point.

5. This is not only because Zarif (among others) would make Trump look inarticulate, but also because it would totally undercut the U.S. sanctions on Zarif if Trump and Mnuchin participated in an event where "specially designated global terrorist" was also a speaker.

6. So for the sake of Trump's appearances, my guess is that @wef was compelled to push Zarif out. Maybe they first pushed back on the American demand in the name of dialogue, but if so, it's easy to imagine they were threatened with some kind of legal action if they hosted Zarif.

7. What @borgebrende and @wef were probably lacking was clear backing from European leaders. Like so many European enterprises + organizations, the U.S. has been given latitude to issue threats and diktats, leveraging sanctions powers. European leaders have been quiet.

8. If the sanctions on Zarif did play a role as I suspect, the precedent set is pretty dire. Switzerland played host to a significant portion of the nuclear negotiations that led to the JCPOA and events such as WEF have provided key venues for backchannel dialogue over the years.

9. The U.S. is using sanctions designations of foreign diplomats and subsequent threats to prevent dialogue, and it is seriously limiting the places and formats in which negotiations can take shape—Zarif was recently barred from attending a UN meeting.
foreignpolicy.com/2020/01/06/tru…

10. It's important to note that the use of sanctions to specifically prevent dialogue with/by adversaries totally undermines a significant body of U.S. law devised by Congress that makes clear sanctions should not be used for those purposes. The Trump administration doesn't care.

11. If @wef was indeed pressured into this decision, the least they could do is acknowledge it publicly. No one can expect them to single-handedly resist U.S. pressure, but the attendees at Davos should be reminded again of the costs the global community pays by feting Trump.

@wef 12. Small, but important correction to add. Realized Zarif is designated under EO 13876 and not global terrorism EO 13224—so not SDGT. He is designated for acting "on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran."
home.treasury.gov/news/press-rel…

13. This small legal point aside, it's pretty clear the administration sees Zarif as a "terrorist" all the same.