1/ Thread to get me yelled at by pretty much everyone:
The UK negotiating position and posture in the EU FTA actually makes perfect sense from the government's perspective.
But I'm still not sure it's the right one.
The UK negotiating position and posture in the EU FTA actually makes perfect sense from the government's perspective.
But I'm still not sure it's the right one.
2/ To arrive at this conclusion, I'm postulating two facts not in evidence.
Postulate one:
The government actually believes its own version of the Withdrawal Agreement negotiation story.
May was never serious about No-Deal, but Johnson forced EU concessions because he'd do it.
Postulate one:
The government actually believes its own version of the Withdrawal Agreement negotiation story.
May was never serious about No-Deal, but Johnson forced EU concessions because he'd do it.
3/ As you know, that's not exactly my read of how that all went down, but recent events feel like the government has internalised their characterisation as fact.
4/ Postulate two:
Like any political force, the primary objective of the government is to retain their majority in Parliament and survive the next election.
That's not a criticism by the way. Having the world's most virtuous policies helps no one if you're stuck in opposition.
Like any political force, the primary objective of the government is to retain their majority in Parliament and survive the next election.
That's not a criticism by the way. Having the world's most virtuous policies helps no one if you're stuck in opposition.
5/ With these assumptions in hand, the government strategy of aggressive, often misleading, and exclusively domesticly focused, communications starts to make a lot more sense.
6/ If the government fundamentally believes the EU has no stomach for WTO-Brexit and will compromise their objectives to avoid it, then all it needs to do to extract concessions is demonstrate over and over its willingness to finish 2020 without a deal.
7/ UK negotiators can claim it's unafraid of No-Deal if the majority of the UK public have been convinced:
A) EU requests are unreasonable.
B) UK tried its best to be fair
C) No-Deal is fine.
D) Any hardship is patriotic suffering in the face of EU regulatory colonialism.
A) EU requests are unreasonable.
B) UK tried its best to be fair
C) No-Deal is fine.
D) Any hardship is patriotic suffering in the face of EU regulatory colonialism.
8/ The advantage of this for the government is that politically it's win win.
If they're right and the EU buckles, they get the FTA they want and return as heroes.
If they're wrong, the groundwork is in to politically rebrand failure as justified resistance to EU extortion.
If they're right and the EU buckles, they get the FTA they want and return as heroes.
If they're wrong, the groundwork is in to politically rebrand failure as justified resistance to EU extortion.
9/ A downside of this approach is that it assumes an almost crystalline fragility to EU resolve that just isn't hugely in evidence.
The EU's negotiating mandate doesn't read like it was drafted by German automakers terrified of losing access to "Treasure Island".
The EU's negotiating mandate doesn't read like it was drafted by German automakers terrified of losing access to "Treasure Island".
10/ Another is that the consequences of Brexit, especially of one on WTO terms, promise to be fairly significant.
To increase public support for walking away from the table, the government must constantly talk these down.
That could have consequences both practical and real.
To increase public support for walking away from the table, the government must constantly talk these down.
That could have consequences both practical and real.
11/ A final downside is that so much of what is in contention in the FTA is about the balance between trust and legal obligation.
The UK's posture may be building up its No-Deal resolve, but it is simultaneously undermining the trust the EU needs to feel comfortable backing off.
The UK's posture may be building up its No-Deal resolve, but it is simultaneously undermining the trust the EU needs to feel comfortable backing off.
12/ Conclusion: The UK Government's approach makes sense both within their internal logical framework and as part of their political calculus.
I am however skeptical of the former and concerned about the lives that may be ruined, even if that does not threaten the Tory majority.
I am however skeptical of the former and concerned about the lives that may be ruined, even if that does not threaten the Tory majority.
Note:
