Thread by @m_suchkov

THREAD: #Russia-#Turkey interaction over #NagornoKarabakh getting uneasy. After #Moscow turned down #Ankara’s proposal to set up #Syria-type format for Karabakh (#KarabakhAstana) @MevlutCavusoglu told #Lavrov cease-fire not gonna happen until #Armenia leaves occupied Azeri areas

Earlier, I forecasted 👇 that #Turkey's ultimate goal in this war was not to fight anyone but get a new deal with #Russia. It was obvious from @RTErdogan's criticism of Minsk OSCE group performance on #Karabakh. Bu the devil is in details & here they are

https://twitter.com/m_suchkov/status/1310911822833373184

1.#Turkey's position - to support #Azerbaijan - meant to disguise its interest - to extend its influence in #Caucasus.
Turkey hopscotching crises -#Greece/#Cyprus,#Libya,#Syria now Karabakh to increase its capitalization in the market of regional powers w/ great power ambitions

2. To promote its interest, #Turkey seeks to reach 3 goals
A. To change status-quo in #NagornoKarabakh conflict in favor of #Azerbaijan
B. To ensure a role of a new mediator for itself
Ankara said it was raedy to support #Baku "both in the fight or at the negotiating table”

3. #Turkey seems to care little that this new role is not acceptable for #Armenia. Eventually, #Assad also not happy that Turkey sits on “Astana group”, #Haftar openly sabotages third-party agreements w/ #Erdogan. What matters is the new status is recognized & emraced by #Russia.

This👉3d goal:
C. Create mechanism of interaction b/n #Russia & #Turkey over #NagornoKarabakh which will be another link in the chain of #Putin-#Erdogan deals in RUS southern security flank.
Over last few years the deals been mutually beneficial but also fraught w/ complications

4. Despite all the difficulties b/n the two in #Syria & #Libya, it's crystallized that #Turkey sees #Russia as a resource for creating its strategic autonomy, while RUS needs TUR as a tool of increasing its own authority as a great power

5. The problem w/ a deal over #Karabakh is that for now #Russia lacks a set of constructive incentives to work w/ #Turkey over the issue.
TUR's deal w/ RUS over SYR was a rather "forced", tactical move...

Being under #Russia/n sanctions over the downed jet, w/ loyal opposition groups severely softened by #Russia, SAA & #Iran & with little support from the West, @RTErdogan figured that bandwagoning w/ #Moscow (& #Tehran) will leave #Ankara w/ at least something in #Syria

6.#Erdogan got a lot more, but it also worked for #Russia/n interest at that time: #Turkey was pulled away from the coalition of the willing to topple #Assad & could serve as a confidant for opposition groups in their own contacts w/ Moscow.RUS made itself a lesser evil than Iran

7. In #Karabakh none of the conditions in place. #Russia thinks it has enough leverage on both parties, Minsk OSCE, as imperfect as it is helps advance RUS interest in preserving status quo (which favors #Armenia more than #Azerbaijan).

In fact, given current divergences b/n #Turkey & #France, #Russia/n interest woul be better served via Minsk OSCE than via a deal w/ #Erdogan. (Note: Putin, @EmmanuelMacron conversation today despite the #Navalny case)

8. Most importantly, #Russia's engagement in the #Caucasus, its mediation role in #Karabakh AND potential "echoes" for its North Caucasus make #Moscow controlling security stakeholder in the region - w/ no interest to sell its shares to anyone else, be it #US, #EU or #Turkey.

9. I'm sure #Turkey gets all of this yet they plug away w/ this proposal over 3 reasons, imo:
A. Russia doesn't need war & not ready for war. Domestically, it's more costly for Putin than Erdogan to get involved in the fight.
+RUS has less diverse mil toolbox in Caucasus than TUR

#Russia's supply lines could only go via #Iran & by air; its manpower limited to regular troops & possibly mercenaries, but this is a more exhaustibel resource than the militants Turkey may export from Syria/Libya. Bad options for RUS.

10. Consideration B:
#Russia seeks to de-Westernize international relations even more than #Turkey.In #Syria,the two left the West outside major decisions (for better or worse). Perhaps, the experience gained in Syria may be applied to Karabakh (as noted above I don;t think so)

11. MOST IMPORTANTLY:
Success of #Russia's strategy in Caucasus depends on #Moscow's ability to do effective balancing.
Success of #Turkey's strategy depends on scale of its political & mil support for Turkic groups.
RUS strategy more difficult to execute. TUR's is easier.

12. Eventually, #Turkey may activate a "spoiler" option & than #Russia's foreign policy gonna get full-handed in the new front (after #Syria, #Libya, #Ukraine..).
Yet accepting a new role for #Turkey will weaken RUS position in the long run+would be bad for #Armenia, scary for EU

13. What #Russia can do is to try to freeze this #Turkey's assertiveness, put it on a pause somehow.
TUR usually has idea for what it can do now & a long term vision of where it wants to be (great power) but it tends to perfom poorly in the mid-term.

14. #Turkey would start with a lot of drive then run into troubles & pause & seek for ways out via deals w/ #Russia and/or #US. That's where RUS needs to take it from here knowing what it wants to do long term (it doesnt know now).
So, how do you say "nyet" in Turkish? :)
/END
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