Ok. Good question well asked.
Let's start with a brief examination of the UK's geographical and international position.
The UK comprises a group of islands (don't worry, I'm not about to make *that* argument) flanked on two sides by 'open seas' to the South and West and 'enclosed seas' to the North and East
The UK comprises a group of islands (don't worry, I'm not about to make *that* argument) flanked on two sides by 'open seas' to the South and West and 'enclosed seas' to the North and East
Its position inextricably ties it to parts of the continent. Though these locations have shifted throughout history (the Scheldt estuary, NW France & latterly the Norwegian coast all feature) the UK is only territorially secure when those locations are secured.
It is worth noting that, since 1945, all of these locations have been in the hands of increasingly closely allied countries. While some, notably Norway, were credibly threatened by the prospect of Soviet invasion during the Cold War none were held by a hostile regime.
The defining element of the Cold War at sea in Europe for the UK was the 'GIUK gap'. The line between Greenland, Iceland and the UK. Fundamentally this was a position of strength. The Soviet Navy were boxed into the Norwegian Sea and had break past NATO navies holding the gap.
This geographical reality has not changed since the fall of the Soviet Bloc and the rise of Putin's revanchist Russia. While NATO neglected tgis areas during the 2000s the core infrastructure largely remains. IUSS (The successor to the SOSUS sonar arrays), airbases and radars.
While the Russian Northern Fleet has some big and impressive ships and submarines, as well as a handful of newer and much quieter boats like the Yasen class SSN their precipitous economic decline and damaging sanctions make its longer term prospects bleak.
The Russian bear at sea remains caged, while it may rattle the bars and occasionally creep past its jailer to do some mischief in the third world, its geographical position remains an almost insurmountable problem.
In terms of conventional maritime defence the UK's territory enjoys a very high degree of security in relation to its only proximate peer rival: Russia. Crucially, this trend continues in spite of Putin's military modernisation.
The carriers, while very useful in the context of a hypothetical European conflict, are not just another bar in Russia's cage. They exist to exploit the UK's access to the 'open seas' to the South West. A space where maritime forces can manoeuvre for military & political effect.
Something that we, the Americans and the French have been doing for generations.
But why is the carrier *the* platform for the UK to do this with? It's hardly a great revelation to point out that other types of warship; frigates, destroyers, corvettes & etc... are common amongst our allies whereas capital ships, such as carriers, remain much rarer.
Politically the UK operates as part of a US-led western military system, to which there are, bluntly, no realistic alternatives (sorry EU). We, like all other 'Western' Europen countries, depend on the existence of that US system to support our power beyond Europe.
The relationship is, to some extent, transactional. All parties benefit to a significant degree.
So why, within this system, are carriers important for the UK?
Especially considering that it's widely believed the US Navy has more carriers than they know what to do with.
So why, within this system, are carriers important for the UK?
Especially considering that it's widely believed the US Navy has more carriers than they know what to do with.
Well, put bluntly, the US Navy doesn't have more carriers than it knows what to do with. Realistically its ten Nimitz class CVNs and one Ford class CVN will generate three on station and one in transit. Generally these ships are 'East of Suez' (in UK parlance).
The number of US Carriers has declined substantially since the eighteen they fielded at the end of the Cold War. Even if President Trump gets his twelfth CVN there will still be a substantial gap between the Number of US Navy regional commands and available carriers.
Why does this matter to the UK?
Firstly, an increasingly burdened and weary US is going to struggle to maintain that mutually beneficial international order. High profile military and political support is required to help keep them in the game long-term. Carriers do this.
Firstly, an increasingly burdened and weary US is going to struggle to maintain that mutually beneficial international order. High profile military and political support is required to help keep them in the game long-term. Carriers do this.
Secondly, the USN regional commands least likely to have carriers attached are those we'd most like to be as robust as possible. Most notably the 5th and 6th Gleets, responsible for the Gulf & Europe, including the Mediterranean. This is where carriers fit into the big picture.
There's also the sovereign angle to this as well. The RN is undergoing a major change to the way it operates in order to generate the core carrier task group. The focus will go from singleton deployments to group deployments with a UK core and attached allies. Similar to France.
The UK will remain capable of generating a UK only task group when necessary, but this would be the exception rather than the rule.
This gives a degree of flexibility few other countries will have, especially in terms of the diplomatic effect of such a deployment.
This gives a degree of flexibility few other countries will have, especially in terms of the diplomatic effect of such a deployment.
Fundamentally the carriers leverage the UK's free access to the 'open seas' in order to achieve outsized diplomatic and political effect alongside allies and, in rarer circumstances, alone.
They are a fantastic capability and a major investment in a different sort of navy, one that has been decades in the making. There will be challenges on all fronts with something like this but the rationale is clear and the potential value substantial.
