Germany, Trump and why the transatlantic alliance remains vital for Europe and for America — a thread in 28 tweets.
With his comments, Trump is pushing Germany to become another country: more "militaristic" (with much higher defense spending), more self-sufficient (less export-oriented), more nationalist (with much less open borders) — in other words, to become more like Trump's America. /1
Germans are used to respond to US pressure. America always was the Great Protector: of German freedom, security and of its economy which needs a global economic order. Post WWII-Germany adapted itself perfectly to US demands and carved out its space in a US-dominated world. /2
And so Germany became what it is now: a "postmodern", open, cosmopolitan country deeply embedded in three mutually reinforcing international orders, the European order (EU), the transatlantic order (Nato), and the global order (the American-made liberal international order). /3
In line with US-driven "demilitarisation", and with French attempts to keep the German armed forces under control (to prevent another "strange defeat" like 1940), Germany developed a "civilian", anti-militaristic identity -- the opposite of the pre-1945 "Machtstaat" ideology. /4
And Germany developed a "civilian" and "multilateral" economy: Instead of building some of the best weapons of the world, after 1945 it has de-militarized its engineering genius and has started to build world-class cars and machinery, selling them to the world. /5
All that has been based on a transatlantic deal: America is providing the safe space in which Germany can focus on the development of its economy and its social contract. What the US got from this deal was a Germany in harmony with its neighbors and a first-class ally. /6
Both sides were often unhappy, complaining about the others' real or imagined failures. But overall both were convinced that the partnership delivered its strategic benefits; besides the complaints there was a positive joint agenda. That's why it lasted for more than 70 years. /7
Modern, post-WWII Germany has been born and grew up in this configuration. It became a "postmodern" country: anti-nationalist, multilateralist, open, globalist. It was an exception even in Europe where France and Britain remained largely "old-fashioned" nation-states. /8
Today Germany, under Merkel's leadership, resists the pressure to change its overall attitude and to become more "modern". Merkel since years repeats the gospel preaching "21st century politics": multilateralism, cooperation, openness, globalisation, win-win solutions. /9
Obama, while having similar complaints about Germany as Trump has today ("free-rider", trade imbalances), has largely shared Merkel's worldview; they worked hand in hand to push back against Russia's attempts to bring back old-fashioned geopolitics into Europe. /10
Trumps however seems determined to unravel the US-German deal. He keeps attacking Germany for its post-modern attitude, mixing longstanding complaints about Germany with hardcore ideology. Probably because postmodern Germany represents the opposite of Trumpism. /11
Germany is stunned by these attacks. It has been, with a few exceptions, a perfect US ally; its liberal and democratic institutions and attitudes are, among other things, a response to the demands of an occupier who became a friend and generous protector. /12
Merkel tries to engage Trump, but he won't listen. At the same time she tries to strengthen partnerships inside (France) and outside Europe (Japan-EU trade agreement), and works even with challengers (China and Russia) in order to safeguard elements of the status quo. /13
In response to Trump there are however alternatives to Merkelism emerging in Germany: Some on the more radical left would welcome a break with America (finally!) and move closer to Russia, or at least in a neutral position. /14
The other response is affirmative: yes, let's become more like Trump's America — more nationalist, less immigrant-friendly, less pro-EU. Rising CSU star Söder said that "the time of orderly multilateralism" is over. /15
And the recent anti-Merkel rebellion by CSU leaders (watched with sympathy by some in CDU) can also be seen as an attempt to replace Merkel with someone who is more in line with Trump. It is significant that they clashed about closing borders, a core element of Trumpism. /16
The rebellion has been called off because the German public is not (yet) supporting a fundamental U-turn; Merkel and her "postmodern" defense of the liberal order is still what the majority supports. /17
Merkel is a key driver, and a symbol, for the current German strategy to deal with Trumpism. Her goal is to protect the multilateral, liberal order: do the hard work with Trump, keep the EU as strong as possible, defend the global trade order. /18
But ultimately Merkel's success relies on Trump; if his disruptive words are followed by deeds, there is nothing Merkel can do. The more Trump wrecks this order, the more the two other camps in Germany, the rising nationalists and the pro-Kremlin forces will gain ground. /19
There are mainly two alternative futures for Germany on the horizon in a post-American world: either a weak center in Europe, inviting major powers to compete for influence (the pre-1806 Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation model) … /20
… or an "unchained", nationalist Germany that is too big and too strong for Europe, leading to distrust among neighbours and a dangerous game of anti-German alliances between other European powers (the Kaiserreich 1871-1914 -model). /21
The third alternative would be a more united Europe. Yet in the past European unification has worked because the US has provided a safe geopolitical space, especially protecting borders against a Soviet Union/Russia that keeps on defining itself as an expansionist empire. /22
In order to take over geopolitical leadership from the US, in a post-American world, Europe would have to build its own center of decision-making: a center that can impose decisions with authority — a center that is seen as largely legitimate by all. /23
Today Washington still serves as such a center, when it comes to security. It is hard to see where such an authority could emerge in Europe. Nation-states won't go away, but they can only decide in consensus. They will keep their vetos over questions of war and peace. /24
In other words: the European order as it is relies on the readiness of a benevolent America to provide protection. If an American president decides to dissolve Nato, the most likely development is not the emergence of a unified Europe capable to take care of its own security. /25
It is much more likely that Europeans would be more divided in such a scenario. More than one year into the Trump presidency with all its doubts over the US commitment for Europe, we see a Europe more, not less divided (over security, the economy, migration). /26
What follows from that is that Europe and the US have a major geopolitical interest in maintaining their close alliance. It has provided peace, security, freedom and prosperity for more than 70 years; it would be foolish to throw it into the dustbin of history. /27
That doesn't mean that the status quo is perfect, au contraire. Europe has to do more, Germany needs to move, the EU can do better and should have a role in security. But these are adjustments inside an Western order which to maintain is an overriding interest of both sides. /28
