Good piece. I too am skeptical of the Bank's new "Famine Action Mechanism" - I fear it misdiagnoses the problem. 1/
The selling points of the Bank's mechanism seem to be 1) better predictive data, and 2) Bank resources directed based on that data.
These are good things, but nowhere near the game changer the Bank is selling it as.
2/
These are good things, but nowhere near the game changer the Bank is selling it as.
2/
Food crisis prediction is *already* very, very, very accurate. The IPC process does a good job of this, as does USAID's FEWSNET system.
For example, the 2011 Somali famine was declared in July, but FEWSNET began ringing the alarm 6 months earlier.
3/ reliefweb.int/sites/reliefwe…
For example, the 2011 Somali famine was declared in July, but FEWSNET began ringing the alarm 6 months earlier.
3/ reliefweb.int/sites/reliefwe…
Likewise Yemen, likewise Ethiopia's crisis in 2016, likewise South Sudan....
The problem here is not a data gap, and snazzy new AI systems won't change donors' calculus. It's a donor-political-economy gap and a humanitarian access gap. 4/
The problem here is not a data gap, and snazzy new AI systems won't change donors' calculus. It's a donor-political-economy gap and a humanitarian access gap. 4/
And statements like this one from Jim Kim concern me because they suggest the Bank doesn't well understand the problem that this mechanism purports to fix. 5/ 
The classic problem with famines (dating back to Amartya Sen's seminal writings on this) is that they are inherently political. They only occur when governments catastrophically fail to manage them (or at times, when govts intentionally create them). 6/ nytimes.com/2003/03/01/art…
Famines and major food crises in recent years all fit this pattern:
- Somalia 2011 - no functioning govt; donor funding blocked by terrorism concerns; relief access blocked by militants
- Nigeria 2016 - relief access blocked by militants
7/
- Somalia 2011 - no functioning govt; donor funding blocked by terrorism concerns; relief access blocked by militants
- Nigeria 2016 - relief access blocked by militants
7/
- South Sudan 2017 - relief access blocked by govt violence/corruption
- Yemen 2015-present - relief access blocked by Saudi restrictions, Houthi obstruction, and intentional Saudi targeting of relief infrastructure
8/
- Yemen 2015-present - relief access blocked by Saudi restrictions, Houthi obstruction, and intentional Saudi targeting of relief infrastructure
8/
By contrast, in 2016 Ethiopia suffered a drought worse than the drought that contributed to the famed 1984 famine. Yet Ethiopia didn't fall into famine and dramatically fewer people died. Why? Much better govt leadership, and effective humanitarian response. 9/
To be clear - it's great that the Bank is ponying up resources for this stuff, and it has the potential to make a difference in the non-famine scenarios like Ethiopia in 2016 (where donor funding was robust, but slow). 10/
But it's unlikely to avert famines - because it doesn't touch the political conditions that cause them.
On the data side, donor behavior is inherently reactive, and perhaps-modestly-more-accurate projections won't resolve that. 11/
On the data side, donor behavior is inherently reactive, and perhaps-modestly-more-accurate projections won't resolve that. 11/
And WB's money is not going to do much good in places like 2011 Somalia, South Sudan or Yemen, where the problem is access and violence, not funding. 12/
I'm glad the Bank is getting into the game on this and I think they have a lot of value to add. But suspect it is far more to do with preparedness, national safety nets (another part of what works in Ethiopia), and resilience investments than famine per se. /end
