Thread by @RALee85

Thread: quite interesting article by retired GRU spetsnaz officer Sergey Kozlov regarding the recent fracas at the Ryazan Guards Higher Airborne Command School (RGVVDKU) and the state of training for future spetsnaz officers.
vz.ru/society/2019/6…

In April, a group of ~40 cadets at the premier academy that trains future VDV, spetsnaz, and NI officers, RGVVDKU, tore off their epaulettes and left them at the monument to Vasily Margelov, the former CO of the VDV. One sign said, "only Margelov can take off our epaulettes." 2/

The cadets were protesting the decision to strip them of their sky-blue epaulettes for olive drab ones standard in the rest of the military. One of the signs left at the monument said, "by taking our epaulettes, you bury our memory." 3/

The cadets were not happy that the distinguishing device would be removed, which symbolized their elite status. RGVVDKU officials said that the change was only for their camouflage uniforms, not their everyday or dress uniforms. And they would keep their sky-blue berets. 4/

After the outcry, including from a local Duma MP for Ryazan, the MoD and former VDV commander Shamanov said no uniform change would happen, and that commanders who didn't properly convey this information to their subordinates would be punished. 5/
gazeta.ru/army/2019/04/2…

The MoD released a decree in 2015 (order 300) that said camouflage uniforms should be worn during field exercises, and everyday uniforms should be worn in other garrison occasions. The everyday uniform for the VDV and spetsnaz is a blue uniform, with blue epaulettes, and beret.6/

However, cadets at RGVVDKU traditionally wore a camouflage uniform with blue epaulettes in the summer, which allowed cadets to quickly move from garrison to field exercises without having to change. Which thus broke the new MoD directive. 7/

In April, the head of the school, Major General Alexei Ragozin, sought to get the RGVVDKU in line with the MoD policy and ordered a change to their uniforms. The decision was justified as to not provide a good target for snipers when in their field uniforms. 8/

Which was an absurd justification given that the cadets would never wear field uniforms with blue epaulettes if they were sent on a combat deployment, and the cadets were still to wear their blue berets and blue name tapes, which limited any camouflage benefits. 9/

Rogozin apparently blamed his subordinates for failing to execute the order properly, and according to Kozlov, the spetsnaz cadet battalion was in particular blamed for the incident. "The spetsnaz disgraced themselves and cast a shadow on the VDV" was the perception. 10/

Kozlov says the school's leadership divided the cadets into "ours" (i.e. VDV) and "not ours" (i.e. spetsnaz). This division began back in 1968 when a separate unit was set up for training future spetsnaz officers, which later became the 9th Company. 11/

The cadets of the 9th Company generally performed very well, but RGVVDKU leaders resented the disciplinary issues in the company, which were due to the different attributes desired for future spetsnaz officers: independent thinkers capable of taking bold actions. 12/

At one point, the leadership of the school tried to disband the 9th Company, until the GRU intervened. After that the Company's status was preserved but its commander from then on reported to the head of the school. 13/

After the fall of the USSR, spetsnaz training changed multiple times. It was transferred from RGVVDKU to the Novosibirsk Higher Military Command School. NVVKU was hit hard during the Serdyukov reforms, like all of the spetsnaz. 14/

But Vladimir Shamanov, the former VDV commander and now head of the State Duma Defense Committee, managed to allocate 10 billion rubles for the training of SSO, VDV, NI, and spetsnaz officers at RGVVDKU. Thus, spetsnaz training was transferred back to Ryazan. 15/

But this reform had a side effect: the spetsnaz cadets were not dedicated to the GRU, but fell under the MoD more generally. The GRU was just one customer of officers from RGVVDKU, and it no longer had the ability to control the curriculum or training of these officers. 16/

As a result, nearly none of the instructors at RGVVDKU are spetsnaz officers, so VDV paratrooper officers train them and set their example. According to Kozlov, instructors openly refer to the spetsnaz cadets as "second-class" "dregs" and other insults. 17/

Apparently, the training for the spetsnaz is not well thought out or structured, and they are often used in dog and pony demonstrations. Whereas, previously spetsnaz cadets were not allowed to be photographed or involved in parades because of their future missions. 18/

Aside from the lack of instructors with spetsnaz backgrounds, Kozlov said there is a shortage of experienced instructors, and they are overburdened with classes. In addition, civilian instructors are paid a meager salary less than what the cadets earn. 19/

Which causes cadets to not properly respect them. Kozlov thinks General Ragozin doesn't understand how to properly train spetsnaz officers, since he cancelled long field exercises because of a lack of logistics support conduct the exercises. 20/

As Kozlov points out, this should not be necessary for spetsnaz officers who are supposed to be able to adapt and remain tactical at all times in the field (i.e. no need for tents or field kitchens). Despite solid funding, the dive center at the school isn't in operation. 21/

Apparently, much of the training facilities were never moved from NVVKU back to RGVVDKU, including not enough computers. As a result, in recent years, some spetsnaz cadets have receiving failing grades in state exams, which never previously happened. 22/

There were previous cases where cadets would be sent to their units as Sergeants instead of as officers because of disciplinary problems, but never for academic failure. General Ragozin blamed his predecessor for these issues, but he has been in charge for 2 years. 23/

In addition, due to administrative mistakes, of the more than 250 spetsnaz cadets graduating this year, only 80 will actually serve in a spetsnaz brigade. The rest will serve in tank, motor rifle, or non combat units, so much of their training is a waste. 24/

Kozlov, reserve Colonel Pavel Kostin, and Vladimir Kovtun (who receive the Hero of Russia award for capturing a Stinger MANPADS in Afghanistan) provided a list of recommendations. 25/

1) They suggest that the responsibility for training the spetsnaz battalion should revert back to the GRU if the RGVVDKU staff don't show more interest.
2) The opening for the school's deputy for spetsnaz training should be given to a spetsnaz officer with combat experience. 26/

He should have command experience at least at the battalion level, should be directly subordinate to the head of the school for internal issues and to the GRU for all other issues, and he should be in charge of developing the curriculum/training plan for the spetsnaz cadets. 27/

3) Instructors should be assigned who have combat experience and served in various spetsnaz units, including SSO.
4) Increase the salary of instructors at the school.
5) The school should coordinate with the GRU and SSO on how to employ SOF in combat.
28/

6) Exclude any unnecessary training, including dog and pony shows.
7) To promote commanders of cadets who perform well in tests.
29/