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NEW: The Senate Intelligence Committee has just released the first volume of its bipartisan Russia investigation report. This volume deals with election security. You can read it here: intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/… 
Back in May 2018, the committee released a summary of this volume of the report. Today they’re releasing the whole thing (with redactions).
Background: buzzfeednews.com/article/emmalo…
Background: buzzfeednews.com/article/emmalo…
Committee chairman @SenatorBurr says that “[i]n 2016, the U.S. was unprepared at all levels of government for a concerted attack from a determined foreign adversary on our election infrastructure,” and “[t]here is still much work that remains to be done."
@SenatorBurr @MarkWarner: "I hope the bipartisan findings and recommendations outlined in this report will underscore to the White House and all of our colleagues, regardless of political party, that this threat remains urgent, and we have a responsibility to defend our democracy against it.”
The committee has four more volumes to release, including one on the “remaining counterintelligence questions.” A volume on social media is in declassification review (so it’ll likely be released next). The committee "intends to release the remaining installments in fall 2019."
I’m going to read through the report, but here are the findings the committee is highlighting.
First one: "The Russian government directed extensive activity against U.S. election infrastructure.” The activity continued "into at least 2017."
First one: "The Russian government directed extensive activity against U.S. election infrastructure.” The activity continued "into at least 2017."
Included at the end of the report are five pages of minority views from Sen. @RonWyden. One of his concerns: "I cannot support a report whose top recommendation is to "reinforce[ ] state's primacy in running elections."
@RonWyden @KamalaHarris, @MichaelBennet, and @MartinHeinrich have one page of “additional views,” too. “[W]e share some of our colleagues' concems about the vulnerability that we face, particularly at the state level, where counties with limited resources must defend themselves against…"
@RonWyden @KamalaHarris @MichaelBennet @MartinHeinrich I’d like to take a moment to thank the committee for making the document word-searchable 🙏🏻
@RonWyden @KamalaHarris @MichaelBennet @MartinHeinrich p. 4: "While the Committee does not know with confidence what Moscow's intentions were, Russia may have been probing vulnerabilities in voting systems to exploit later."
@RonWyden @KamalaHarris @MichaelBennet @MartinHeinrich p. 5: "In its review of the 2016 elections, the Committee found no evidence that vote tallies were altered or that voter registry files were deleted or modified, though the Committee and IC's insight into this is limited."
p. 5 cont: "the Committee found ample evidence to suggest
that the Russian government was developing and implementing capabilities to interfere in the 2016 elections, including undermining confidence in U.S. democratic institutions and voting
processes."
that the Russian government was developing and implementing capabilities to interfere in the 2016 elections, including undermining confidence in U.S. democratic institutions and voting
processes."
p. 6: The committee says that in March 2018, the Dept. of Homeland Security told them that an “attack resulted in data exfiltration from the voter registration database.” The part before is redacted, but the paragraph discusses Russians’ targeting of Illinois’ election systems.
An interesting part of the report so far has been the footnotes. Senate Intel is very tight-lipped about its activities, and the footnotes give a glimpse of the types of documents/interviews they’ve reviewed as part of the probe. Here, an interview with Andrew McCabe is listed.
An email titled "Kislyak Protest of FBI Tactics” is also listed there. Not sure we’ve seen that before, but I could be wrong.
p. 10: "Scanning of election-related state infrastructure by Moscow was the most widespread activity the IC and DHS elements observed in the run up to the 2016 election."
p. 11: Things that are redacted but would be good to know...
p. 15: "DHS briefed Committee staff three times on the attacks, and staff reviewed hundreds of pages of intelligence assessments."
p. 16: All the states the committee except Illinois are identified by numbers instead of their names. It looks like in late 2017/early 2018, committee staff had several conference calls with individual states.
we stan the committee’s subtle support for gay rights
- "a thief casing a parking lot"
- "cataloging holes to come back later”
- "analogous to somebody walking down the street and looking
to see if you are home”
As a non-cyber expert, I appreciate these analogies from officials!
- "cataloging holes to come back later”
- "analogous to somebody walking down the street and looking
to see if you are home”
As a non-cyber expert, I appreciate these analogies from officials!
Some state election officials: things are fine!
DHS: um…...no
(p. 19)
DHS: um…...no
(p. 19)
p. 20: "Neither DHS nor the Committee can ascertain a pattern to the states targeted, lending credence to DHS's later assessment that all 50 states probably were scanned."
p. 21, from an Oct. 2018 DHS intelligence assessment: "Unidentified cyber actors since at least April 2018 and as recently as early October continue to engage in a range of potential elections-related cyber incidents targeting election infrastructure…"
p. 22: "The Committee found that Russian-affiliated cyber actors gained access to election infrastructure systems across two states, including successful extraction of voter data. However, none of these systems were involved in vote tallying.”
p. 22: "The compromise [of Illinois's voter database] resulted in the exfiltration of an unknown quantity of voter registration data. Russian cyber actors were in a position to delete or change voter data, but the Committee is not aware of any evidence that they did so."
Report-reading jams.
p. 28: Per the footnote, FISA is mentioned somewhere in this block of redacted text.
This section on "Russian Efforts to Research U.S. Voting Systems," which continues on the next page, is completely redacted — except for this line: "It is unknown if Tarantsov attended the events."
p. 30: "DHS further told the Committee that malicious cyber actors had scanned [REDACTED] a widely-used vendor of election systems."
p. 30: "Department of State were aware that Russia was attempting to send election observers to polling places in 2016. The true intention of these efforts is unknown.”
p. 31: "The Russian Embassy placed a formal request to observe the elections with the Department of State, but also reached outside diplomatic channels in an attempt
to secure permission directly from state and local election officials."
to secure permission directly from state and local election officials."
p. 33: "During a 2017 election, State 17 saw bot activity on social media, including allegations of voter fraud, in particular on Reddit. State 17 had to try to prove later that there
was no fraud."
was no fraud."
p. 35: "Russian intentions regarding U.S. election infrastructure remain unclear."
Former FBI deputy director McCabe on Russia: "[They will] scrape up all the information and the experience they possibly can" & "they might not be effective the first time or the fifth time, but they are going to keep at it until they can come back and do it in an effective way."
(That’s from page 36, FWIW.)
p. 37: "Chaos on Election Day: Three Scenarios,” which included “conducting a denial of service attack on the Associated Press on Election Day"
P. 39: "...as of 2018, some states were still grappling with the severity of the threat."
I unfortunately have to go but if you want to fast-forward to the committee's recommendations, they begin on page 54:
