,
23 tweets,
4 min read
Read on Twitter
Somewhat baffled by the debates I'm seeing about whether a PM has to resign following a vote of no confidence. Convention doesn't demand resignation. In Canada and in UK prior to FTPA, convention would allow a PM to request a dissolution instead. 1/
If the request to dissolve is refused, then the PM resigns. But if the dissolution is granted, the PM remains in office, in hopes of regaining the confidence of the Commons after the election.
If you graft that onto the FTPA, I don't see why a PM would need to resign following a motion of no confidence. They could regain confidence during the 14 interval as per s2.3-7 of FTPA. 3/
Put differently, the convention around resignation isn't automatic resignation following a vote of no confidence. The more accurate rendering of the convention is that the PM resigns if they cannot regain confidence following no confidence, either by motion (FTPA) or postelection
Details here in the Canadian context: revparl.ca/39/2/39n2e_16_…
As many have noted, the FTPA doesn’t affected the conventions around resignation of the PM. But it does alter their context.
FTPA displaced the Queen’s prerogative to dissolve Parliament. In so doing, it also displaced the primary mechanism for changes in govt within a single Parliament: the refusal of a request to dissolve by the Queen.
Prior to FTPA, a PM who lost a traditional vote of confidence, or was dealt with an explicit motion of no confidence, could request a dissolution. If that request was granted, they remained PM and could try to regain confidence post election.
If their request to dissolve Parliament was refused by the Queen, they would normally resign (since the Crown was no longer acting according to their advice) and the Queen would the appoint a new PM.
This is what the FTPA has altered in terms of govt formation. The Queen can no longer refuse a dissolution since she no longer has the prerogative to dissolve. Thus, the primary mechanism to change govts within a Parliament has been removed.
This doesn’t mean that a PM cannot resign and the Queen appoint a new PM. The Queen’s prerogative to appoint and dismiss the PM remains. But now a PM no longer has the dissolution request at their disposal.
Based on what we’ve seen thus far, this seems to have led PMs to read FTPA such that they can wait until a formal motion of no confidence to determine if they’ve lost confidence or not. They’ve made up for the loss of dissolution requests in this way.
This then brings us to what happens when a no confidence motion passes. In that case, the PM can still act as they could have prior to FTPA: they can attempt to regain confidence with a new motion or through an election after the 14 days expire.
A PM could, of course, resign after a no confidence motion, but that’s not what convention originally required, nor what convention requires now. Automatic resignation was never the convention.
So, this exposes what the FTPA is missing: it needs a provision to ensure a change of govt within a single Parliament that does not require a PM to *choose* to resign.
This could be addressed by adding a section to the FTPA such that the Commons can pass a motion of no confidence and request (demand) the resignation of the head of government.
This motion would not trigger a 14 window to regain confidence or dissolve Parliament. Instead, it would trigger the Queen’s prerogative to appoint a new PM (or dismiss the PM, then appoint a new one if the incumbent refuses to go.)
This would address the lacuna that the Queen’s refusal of dissolution has created and the effects it has had on how PM’s can read their obligations to resign.
An additional point to address questions that have been asked. Do the explanatory notes to FTPA demonstrate that s2.3 is meant to ensure a resignation follow a no confidence vote and a possible alternative govt? Not necessarily.
Here are what the notes say. Providing an opportunity for an alternative govt without an election is one possibility. But the wording doesn't exclude the existing govt regaining confidence. Indeed, the previous sentence references 'a Government', which leaves that open. 
If only an alternative Government could secure a new motion of confidence to avoid an election, the notes should have said alternative Government in both cases. They don't.
This suggests four outcomes of s2.3: 1) Election after 14 days, with an incumbent Govt in office; 2) The incumbent Govt regains confidence within 14 days, no election; 3) The incumbent Govt resigns, an alternative Govt secures confidence within 14 days, no election.
4) Incumbent resigns, an alternative Govt appointed. New Govt can't secure confidence within 14 days, therefore election with new Govt in office.
