Thread by @ClaireBerlinski

Meanwhile: I'm not a Kremlinologist, don't read Russian and don't want to pretend to have special insight, but none is needed to understand two things. 1) Putin tends to go on reckless foreign adventures when his domestic popularity sags. 2) His domestic popularity is sagging.

The way it looks to the Kremlin when this kind of thing happens--because it's true--is that the US is not firmly committed to upholding its defense commitments. This is a recipe for disaster.

And all the more so because it's manifestly clear Americans are in a profoundly isolationist mood. Iran just knocked out 5% of the world's energy supplies, and we said, "Well, screw it." There was firm bipartisan support for saying, "Screw it." This sort of thing gets noticed.

We don't actually have forces in place sufficient to protect, say, the Suwalki gap. We have a tripwire; that is, Americans who are there so they can die--which in principle would rouse us to escalate. Our deterrent posture is based on this.

I believe that we actually *would* escalate if Russia wiped out 1,100 US troops and stormed across the Gap. But I'm not *sure* I'm right, given our recent behavior, and I'd I'm not sure, I don't know why Putin would be, either. So we're doing a lousy job of signalling.

I believe, however, that I'm right. We would escalate.

And then we're in a world of risk that no one should explain to Greta Thunberg, if you get my drift.