There has been almost no change in the foreign exchange reserves reported on the PBOC's balance sheet in the past 2 years (apart from a brief period last fall).
It is an eerily quiet series. Somewhat too quiet I suspect
1/x
It is an eerily quiet series. Somewhat too quiet I suspect
1/x
The data for September shows, cough, $0.5b in sales. Nothing.
And my guess is that if there is a "transparency" provision in the currency deal with the US, China will report intervention data that is suspiciously calm, and thus doesn't really tell us much.
2/x
And my guess is that if there is a "transparency" provision in the currency deal with the US, China will report intervention data that is suspiciously calm, and thus doesn't really tell us much.
2/x
China not only has huge state banks, but those big state banks have a massive foreign currency balance sheet. And there are other pools of state funds. Given the nature of China's economy it isn't hard to hide a bit of backdoor intervention.
3/x
3/x
The quote is from an @KeithBradsher and @AnaSwanson article summarizing the possible components of the "mini-deal" with China
4/x
nytimes.com/2019/10/15/bus…
4/x
nytimes.com/2019/10/15/bus…
@KeithBradsher @AnaSwanson I applaud the U.S. Treasury's push to get central banks to disclose purchases and sales of fx in the market (not just reserve growth, which includes interest income).
But also think they need to start casting the net a bit wider for some countries.
5/x
But also think they need to start casting the net a bit wider for some countries.
5/x
@KeithBradsher @AnaSwanson The bulk of the foreign asset accumulation of by the "state" right now in Japan, Korea, Singapore and China isn't coming through the growth of formal reserves, but rather through state banks and sovereign wealth/ pension funds
6/6
6/6
