Having recently been in Berlin, I can report that Franco-German relations are extremely strained - a short thread (with some stuff on Brexit at the end). @CER_EU /1
Paris is fed up with Berlin blocking its plans, eg on euro reform, so is starting to act unilaterally, without 1st consulting Germans - eg the initiative to reset relations with Russia (which GER learned about from Russians) eg the vetoing of accession talks with N Macedonia. /2
At the best of times GER takes decisions more slowly than FRA, lacking the latter's centralised system. And when the German coalition is between 2 parties that are unpopular and can scarcely communicate, decisions become almost impossible and GER is a v frustrating partner. /3
But the Germans are fed up with Macron's mercurial style, grandstanding and public criticism of them. Many consider him to be a France-first Gaullist, wrapped up in superficial European rhetoric. So the Germans are starting to act unilaterally too: /4
eg allowing Huawei to bid for 5G work (FRA wants an EU-wide agreement), eg AKK's ill-thought through initiative to establish a safe zone in Northern Syria. The essence of the divide is that GER thinks the EU/eurozone work OK, while FRA thinks both need radical reform. /5
GER has no intention of agreeing to big changes in eurozone governance. Nor will it boost spending & investment to keep the French happy. Scholz's recent plan for an EU role in bank deposit insurance is a tiny step forward, with many qualifications, and CDU/CSU are hostile. /6
Defence also causes tension, though rhetorically the pair are moving closer - AKK wants to spend more & enhance European defence. But GER thinks NATO or the full EU should be the framework, while FRA has questioned NATO's viability and thinks EU too big & slow to be effective./7
FRA favours smaller groups like the European Intervention Initiative, but GER is lukewarm on that, fearing it will divide the 27. Indeed on many issues - eg building euro institutions - GER thinks French policies divide the EU and ignore the sensibilities of Central Europeans. /8
The view in Berlin is that AKK, the CDU sec-gen and defence minister, is too unpopular to be CDU chancellor candidate. Many favour Armin Laschet, the Merkelian boss of NR-Westphalia. The more conservative & v clever Jens Spahn, health minister, would be a more divisive choice. /9
Germans are fed up Brexit has taken so long, but believe that transition period will have to be extended beyond Dec 20. On future rel, they'll prioritise level playing field (LPF): if UK wants to diverge from EU rules (on soc/envt/consumer/state aid/tax) it'll be a threat.../10
and so it'll be offered a thin 'Canada Minus' rather than a Canada-style FTA. In public GER welcomes withdrawal agreement. In private some fret that N IRE will have access to single market without having to accept all LPF rules; this may distort competition. /11
On security policy, Germans hope to find ways of associating UK v closely, post-Brexit, though they think that will be hard on JHA issues because of role of ECJ. Some politicians support French idea of a European Security Council that wd include UK, but much of German govt.../12
prefers to build on the existing and informal meetings of the E3 of UK, FRA & GER, which wd be less divisive (ESC wd exclude small states) & a less direct threat to EU institutions. /13
Brexit is not helping Franco-German relations. FRA & GER used to each work with the UK to create a balance v the other. Now they've only each other to get annoyed with. And other members are much warier of Franco-German dominance, without UK to temper FRA's & GER's influence. END
