Thread by @MMazarr

A very interesting take on China's militarized islands from the always-insightful @GregPoling at @WarOnTheRocks. The general point is well-taken: We need to be concerned. Some reactions:
warontherocks.com/2020/01/the-co…

To be sure these are a significant military planning factor--especially because, as some have argued, in the weeks before a potential clash China could surge additional capabilities into them. On the other hand ...
warontherocks.com/2016/09/chinas…

1. I am always wary of amateur, open-source military opt'l analysis--mine included. To know how hard it would be to disable these facilities we'd need to talk to planners working the issue. My sense from unclas sources is: Yes they add complexity, but they are pretty vulnerable

2. But two key questions. One: do the islands *change* the military dynamic in fundamental ways. I think, no: risks to US forces in the area are a function of China's larger A2AD efforts, not the capabilities at these islands. Those remain minimal in the bigger context

3. Greg suggests that neutralizing the islands demands "hundreds" of PGMs. Perhaps, but a few billion gets you a load of munitions. Buying enough PGMs to blanket targets far from China is a trivial issue compared to other aspects of regional mil challenge
fortune.com/2016/02/02/pen…

4. These facilities do provide an annoying extra challenge for vulnerable + overstretched US forces in a contingency. But they are not the *cause* of that vulnerability or overextension. We shouldn't leap from understating to overstating their military importance

5. Meantime they have significant military constraints: Taxing weather conditions, huge distance from resupply, etc.
foreignpolicy.com/2019/08/19/chi…

6. Also they may be underwater before too long, or repeatedly battered with major climate-exacerbated storms.
foreignpolicyblogs.com/2018/01/08/cli…

7. The second key question: Just how to they play into a scenario? Greg implies a major conflict in NE Asia w/South China Sea as a "secondary" theater. But if so, the island's aren't an urgent issue. Not really clear what combination of wars is being proposed. NKorea + SCS?

8. If China launches war to grab SCS, going after the islands can fit into US + allied ops. If there are multiple contingencies (China v Japan or DPRK v ROK + SCS), the US is going to have bigger worries than targeting these islands. So again, they do not create unique problems

9. Finally: As he also notes, none of these wars are likely anyway, b/c China wants to win via encroachment. The islands help--but pushback from Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia on legal fight over claims shows the islands have costs, too, and haven't cowed others into submission

10. China's coercive posture, symbolized by the islands, has generated significant blowback w/in the region and beyond. States sailing FONOPS w/US is an example--int'l legal standards at issue. China muscle flexing isn't linear route to influence; sometimes the inverse

11. Bottom line: Greg makes great points. US should boost deterrent posture, develop innovative opt'l concepts for 21st C in Asia, make clear it will back those who stand up to China, expand economic statecraft tools, and Tweet the heck out of China's coercive thuggery. But ...

12. In the long-run, these islands are likely to be viewed as a footnote to the factors that determine the larger US-China competition, and they symbolize a coercive approach that will likely be seen as counterproductive for Beijing. We shouldn't overreact w/spending or policy