Thread by @mabecker17

The #ICJ will announce its ruling on #Gambia’s request for provisional measures against #Myanmar on Thursday, in the case alleging #genocide against the #Rohingya. A few thoughts about what to look out for in the Court's ruling in this thread. 1/12

The threshold question is whether #Gambia established all of the required elements to allow the #ICJ to grant provisional measures (prima facie jurisdiction, plausibility of claims, link between PMs requested and the rights at issue, urgency, and risk of irreparable harm)? 2/12

#Myanmar has tried to muddy the waters on jurisdiction and admissibility, but it is hard to imagine the Court not finding that it has prima facie jurisdiction here. Myanmar will have a second chance to make jurisdiction and admissibility arguments at the case's next phase. 3/12

Myanmar also suggested that domestic initiatives and judicial mechanisms, including the ICOE, show that allegations are being handled internally, such that there is no imminent risk of harm or need for PMs. I would be surprised to see this argument succeed. 4/12

Likewise, Myanmar’s arguments on plausibility seemed to suggest something closer to a requirement of certainty in terms of likelihood of success on the merits. The Court should reject this but perhaps will seek to clarify the evolving plausibility standard along the way. 5/12

Assuming the #ICJ does find these threshold requirements met and indicates provisional measures, the question will be how closely the measures granted track what #Gambia requested. There are several interesting things to watch for here. 6/12

1. Will #ICJ order #Myanmar to take all measures to prevent genocide (an obligation it has anyway), or will the ICJ tell Myanmar to prevent specific conduct that *could* constitute genocide (ranging from extrajudicial killings & sexual violence to destruction of livestock)? 7/12

2. Will the #ICJ order Myanmar not to destroy or make relevant evidence inaccessible (which includes not altering the physical locations of villages that were cleared out)? I would expect the Court to do this, along with standard ‘non-aggravation of the dispute’ language. 8/12

3. Will the #ICJ take up Gambia’s request that Myanmar allow UN investigators into the country to conduct further fact-finding? This was a novel request (although Gambia said otherwise) and the argument in support of such a measure was under-developed at the hearing. 9/12

As a result, I would not be surprised to see this request fail, with the Court in more general terms requiring co-operation from Myanmar that falls short of allowing in-country access for UN investigators. 10/12

4. What kind of monitoring mechanism for PM implementation will the #ICJ impose? Parallel reports within 4 months or something more? Nothing prevents the parties from writing letters to the Court about compliance; the question is whether Myanmar will be compelled to do so. 11/12

Finally, on the global stage, China & Japan have been staunch supporters of Myanmar & #AungSanSuuKyi, even in the face of #genocide allegations, and India’s role in the situation is complex. #ICJ judges are independent actors, but how will the judges from those states vote? END