[THREAD]
1/ Same for any Tunisian of sound mind, especially given the revival of Turkish imperialist mindset. However, Turkey has very strong allies within our political system and state who have not hesitated to put Turkish interests above national interest.
1/ Same for any Tunisian of sound mind, especially given the revival of Turkish imperialist mindset. However, Turkey has very strong allies within our political system and state who have not hesitated to put Turkish interests above national interest.
2/ I'm talking about Ennahdha, who feel under the threat of geopolitical isolation (as a party, not as the Gov of Tunisia) since Sisi coup + Trump election, and even more since Qatar-GCC feud. Turkish AKP remains their most reliable external ally.
3/ They appeared inclined to provide Turkey with economic privileges at the detriment of the national interest (e.g. trade conditions detrimental to our local producers, balance of trade, forex reserves).
4/ Any Turkish support to a government in our region comes with strings attached (as is the case with any other state anyway). The cost of Ennahdha's special relationship w/ Turkey for the Tunisian state is twofold. First, we're being pressured to align with
5/ Ankara (and in certain cases the Ankara-Doha axis) in international disputes that do not concern us as a nation. We have nothing to gain from siding with Turkey and Qatar in their tense relationship with GCC countries. And beyond the Gulf, aligning with Turkey means
6/ the risk of alienating a wide set of international partners/stakeholders some of which are key. This includes the EU, France, and soon Italy (when they become really pissed off with Turkey in Libya), the US, but also smaller players like Greece.
7/ Turkey is increasingly isolated, and for a country like Tunisia, maintaining this "special relationship" will eventually mean picking a side in conflicts that are not are business and in which we have nothing to gain, everything to lose.
8/ Maintaining good relations with Italy, France, or even the UAE will not hurt in the way aligning with an isolated yet aggressively expansionist state like Turkey does. Because alignment with Turkey comes with pressures to actively work against the interests of a large set of
9/ international stakeholders. You cannot be neutral and maintain a special relationship with Turkey in this age. But you can remain neutral even if you maintain a good relationship with say the UAE (as long as you play it smartly and resist pressure to align).
10/ And my second point: Enabling Turkey to gain a foothold in the region (by providing them with influence inside Tunisia or by enabling them to increase their influence in Libya or to project power there) = enabling a neo-colonial agenda which will increase our dependence
11/ vis-a-vis yet another external power (as if being dependent upon the US and the EU were not enough). Turkey attempts to turn our region into its sphere of influence through econ, military and political dependence. Turkish narratives re: North Africa are very telling.
12/ In their view, Turkey failed us when the Ottoman empire declined and left a vacuum enabling European powers to colonise us. God only knows why being a Turkish colony is better than being a European colony. Turkey did not plunder our resources because it lacked the means to,
13/ and experienced imperial overstretch, not because they were a benevolent colonial power. Now Turkey wants to rectify this historical wrong by extracting us from European domination and bringing us into its fold. Turkish discourse re: countries like Tunisia
14/ is very paternalistic (in a "good shepherd" kind of way) and neo-colonialist in nature. Would you want to align with such a country? We're already struggling with EU dominance and US/EU meddling. Let's not buy ourselves an additional foreign overlord.
15/ I believe the key to survival is avoiding being dragged into the losing side of international disputes that do not concern us, maintain our neutrality while maintaining good relationship with every country that matters.
16/ But the key struggle we must engage in is a struggle for our autonomy (as a nation and as a region), which is threatened from all sides. Diversifying our relationships while pushing back against any strings attached is key.
17/ Turkish military aid to Tunisia post-revolution is a great illustration. When our traditional partners (notably the US) refused to sell us MRAPs when we most needed them in anti-guerrilla operations, only Turkey responded positively and sold us these much-needed vehicles.
18/ Buy doing so, Turkey bought influence at the expense of our traditional partners. The thing is, states do not have friends. All pursue their narrowly national interests, and that's not an unhealthy thing. We in Tunisia talk about international relations in a very poetic way
19/ and we keep ascribing friendship to our partners, especially Arab neighbours but also our northern partners. When their interests dictated that they do not help us fight the Jihadi guerrilla after the revolution, we were helpless and Turkey responded. Now we need
20/ a wider range of strong partners to provide us what we need, when what we need is not in the interest of EU countries or the US. Russia and China are obvious candidates, and we've already initiated a rapprochement. Not with a view to aligning but close enough to balance out
21/ EU and US influence when their interests and ours do not converge. Anyway, President Kais Saied rightly refused to enable Erdogan's military venture in Libya. This would not only have pushed us into an axis and antagonised our main partners, but the nature of Turkey's
22/ intervention in Libya poses a threat to our national security (as Turkey enables the proliferation of weapons, Syrian fighters in our backyard, and also enables Libyan factions that could threaten directly our security).
23/ Had Rached Ghannouchi been president this month, I'm not sure he'd have said no to Erdogan.
