Thread by @Trinhnomics

Great paper by a fellow @CarnegieEndow nonfellow @FGodement on the role of the @WHO and the coronavirus crisis we are facing globally.

Allow me to summarize his key pts (thanks @Aligarciaherrer for flagging).

institutmontaigne.org/en/blog/fighti…

https://twitter.com/Aligarciaherrer/status/1243389522982789121

1) WHO did not have on the ground info until 12 Feb but until then, DID NOT question, then & now, China's official assertions, such as no human-to-human transmission on 14 January.
2) WHO has recognized human-to-human transmission on 24 Jan, delaying declaration of an emergency

3) WHO’s failure to recognize proven human-to-human contamination until Jan 23 (going along on 14 Jan China's refusal to admit human to human contamination), DESPITE strong & persistent indications to the contrary, & alerts by Taiwanese officials directly conveyed to the WHO.

4) WHO’s refusal to declare a pandemic until March 11, when virus reached 114 countries & 118,000 cases. As WHO guidelines are for better or for worse followed by countries and even by private actors who can base – and later justify – their actions from these guidelines.

5) Such was the case for example in France, where public authorities were still saying there was no proof of human to human contamination on January 20. Beyond the issue of what WHO can do at times of epidemics, there is a ripple effect from its statements.

6) Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, initially trained as an epidemiologist, is the first WHO Director-General from Africa & AVOIDS all criticism of China (as opposed to other member states).

WHO does not depend for its budget on China, which gives a very small voluntary contribution.

7)Tedros has shown an evident bias to accept Chinese declarations & denials at face value - has created a delay in international responses. This in spite of a very limited Chinese contribution to WHO, but it matches the weakness of other UN orgs in the face of China’s campaigning

8)WHO is a key UN organization – w/ a projected base budget (excpolio and some other special programs) of USD3.8bn in 2020 and a major role in recommending, coordinating and assisting both the prevention and the treatment of major health issues. China contributes 86m in 2019 only

9) Taiwan’s status as a “Chinese province” means it info was officially ignored. We have to search for explanations on the reasons why a USD3,8bn w/large regional offices & some of the world’s most extensive experience of epidemics & emergency responses fell into this trap.

10) China's 86m contribution is LESS than the USA 10% contribution + American voluntary contribution (2% & Gates Foundation alone made up 8% of overall WHO funding).

Such a large discrepancy can only be explained by WHO’s low level of mandatory funding from UN member states.

China’s responses to the Ebola crisis in Africa was delivered bilaterally. When Tedros thanked donors in the present crisis on Feb 8, he listed “the US, the UK, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic, Japan and the Wellcome Trust” & not China.

11) Margaret Chan, 1st PRC national to run a UN agency (2006-'17), & b/c of the insistence by China’s public diplomacy on human welfare, it has often been said that WHO was directly under Chinese influence: shows in the success of China’s campaign to curtail participation of TW.

12) Ms. Chan’s two mandates were lackluster, marked by some polemics at the time of Ebola, by a strange episode of praise for North Korea’s health system, and by several stands against Taiwan for not “respecting” fully the “One China” principle.

13) In 2017 the members of WHO chose along a panel of 3 pre-selected candidates, & Tedros came ahead with 133 votes out of 186 – a margin that even China’s influence cannot explain, but that has to do with his status as representing “the global South".

14)Affiliated with Ethiopia’s Liberation Front, Tedros educated in infectiology & malaria prevention, been a minister of foreign affairs & minister of health. Comes from a country and a continent that is easily critical of Western actors, yet gone down well w/ many private donors

15) During current crisis, defended praise of Beijing by the need to obtain cooperation. Yet took WHO a month and a half – b/n China’s 1st report to WHO of an “unknown illness” and Feb 13 – to send a full expert WHO mission on the ground in China, w/ very limited access to Wuhan.

16) But is this a personal failure, or a reflection of where things have gone more generally at the United Nations and indeed in many international organizations?

There are other examples of these courting a China that does not deliver.

17) UN Refugee Agency, year after year, heaps official praise on China’s Belt & Road Initiative. BRI simply has no discernible relation to refugee issues.

In 2018, China contributed a paltry 1.3m of specified voluntary contribution, US contributed 1600m & EU 1200m!

18) UN system, the importance of its mandatory budget contribution (soon going to 10 % of this class), &the control that China now exercises through its higher profile in budget committees.

And there is the never extinct hope that Beijing will contribute more in the future!!!

19) In short, while the US talks loudly but carries a small stick, China now speaks softly but carries a big stick throughout the UN system.

The question therefore becomes: how reliable WHO really is when major epidemics originate in China?

20) WHO behaves in this case as a true and tried intergovernmental organization, not questioning its official sources, and therefore fails in this regard with its mission of information.

21) What is worse in the present emergency: a number of governments and organizations either believed naively those claims, and the resulting reluctance to declare an epidemic and later a pandemic, or they chose to rely on this false comfort in order to delay difficult measures.

21) But it seems impossible that its members, coming from the scientific community, would not have reflected on the declaratory gap that remained, even if it was not diplomatically useful to challenge China.

22) In the same vein, WHO advised at that time against general travel and trade restrictions.

There never was a word about the delay between December 31st and January 23, including the catastrophic failure to stop all Chinese New Year travel at home and abroad.

23) Since 23 Jan, WHO – & Tedros – have fulfilled much of their essential function: they have repeatedly called for changes in government policy, describing then “a high risk” for the whole world. Lauded China’s containment measures as a “window of opportunity” given to the world

24) WHO has emphasized the policy choices of South Korea – assiduously avoids any mention of Taiwan, excluded from the organization. WHO is now cooperating with the Jack Ma Foundation to distribute masks made in China, where production is said to have ramped up to 115 million/day

25) At this stage, what one can conclude about WHO’s performance is that it has been greatly hampered by China’s limited communication and official denials until January 20, and by a clear political will at the top of the organization to avoid calling out that country.

26) But it is equally clear that once China finally started to implement strong measures against contagion from Wuhan city and Hubei province, the WHO has been able to increasingly play an important role in coordinating information and promoting responses among its 194 members.

27) How to lessen the impact of a relentless authoritarian regime remains an issue. Perhaps, avoiding preemptive submission, and questioning official truths instead of pretending to heed them, would be a start.
Those are @FGodement words. His paper here:
institutmontaigne.org/en/blog/fighti…

I meant non-resident fellow not nonfellow!!! 🤦🏻‍♀️🤦🏻‍♀️🤦🏻‍♀️