Thread by @m_suchkov

THREAD: follow-up on my piece @MiddleEastInst on the much buzzed theme of #Russia “distancing itself” from #Assad.
I appreciate the interest and understand the controversies that some colleagues raised in regards to my piece. Let me clarify a few things
mei.edu/blog/its-not-a…

1. As I noted in the text there’re 2 issues at play here.
(1) has to do with the sourcing of the reports that sparked the whole issue;
(2) has to do with the very nature of this discourse in Russia.

2.On sources - I discussed at lengths what I think was wrong with the reports on #Russia-#Assad that stirred such hype in Western and some Arab media and policy world. The point is - the reports are just inaccurate: they mix facts and make erroneous attributions..

3. ..which makes it look like it’s official Russian policy.
I’m not saying it’s propaganda or fake news, but people initially relied on twisted interpretation of the materials published in Russia which eventually drew them to wrong conclusions.

4. #Russia got its own issues with freedom of press,but it’s no DPRK & critical stuff on #Assad and RUS own campaign in #Syria been published a lot.
Criticism itself coming "from Russia" not a marker of anything. What matters is...

5. ...whether this criticism is being pushed forward by major state-owned media and/or relevant policy-makers. In case of Assad it hasn’t (at least, not yet) been aired in public.

6. The issue with Prigozhin’s media is merky. I am willing to accommodate almost any theory on what role in #Russia’s policy in Middle East (#Syria, #Libya) he may be playing but my point is..

7. that he's a type of guy operating in a type of system which makes it barely possible for a foreign or Russian journalist to know for sure what he is up to – this is top level intelligence stuff.

8. So we can write/read anything on Wagner,trolls, other adventures he is engaged in but it's mostly speculations. Some speculations better informed than others – but relying on them to draw big conclusions about #Russia/n policy in Syria is a bad advice for policy-makers.

9.This brings me to 2nd part of my argument – what is exactly being said of Assad in Russia and what this discourse is really about? Those who have been watching Russian policies in Mideast or discussed it with RU policy-makers/diplomats would know that..

10.. they have (a) different views on #Assad (b) many have critical views. It’s only surprise for neophyte #Russia watchers that “somebody in #Moscow is not happy about Assad”. Moreover, no need to rely on any sensational reports to tell you how #Putin feels about #Assad...

11. In 2016 (if I remember correctly), at one of Valdai talks Putin was asked by a Western journalist smth about Assad. He smirked that the journalist shoulda asked the question Assad directly since before 2015 Assad “was a more frequent guest in Western capitals than in Moscow”

12. This is indicative that #Putin is disillusioned that Bashar’s “loyalty to #Russia” was first and foremost the result of Western policies towards him and he had to turn to Russia to avoid the fate of Hussein and Gadhafi.

13.Even though #Russia had long history of rels with #Syria and in 2005 #Assad came to RU to ask to write-off $13.4 billion SYR state debt. RU wrote off $9.8 billion in exchange for arms sales to SYR military.

14. But the real “alliance” came out as result of Assad being alienated by the West and regional powers and put on the verge of collapse/death.
#Russia partnered with #Assad not cuz he's an awesome guy. It did so because..

15. ..siding w/ him back in the day was
(a) lesser of other evils / the devil you knew
(b) safer bet than picking which of the 50 shades of opposition to support
(c) he had control of army (broken, demoralized but still a force that could be trained and fight on the ground)..

..(d) he was embraced by ethnic minorities
(e) he was - and remains - legitimate president.Even thou he morally delegitimized himself by violent crackdowns and other crimes,his diplomats still sitting in foreign missions and at the UN.

16. Side note 1. - btw it doesn't matter if you agree w/ all of these points, those were the premises Kremlin operated upon (and largely does to the day).

17.Side note 2 - alliances, esp in Mideast, are seldom built on mutual likes but hardcore realpolitik - the game RUS loves to play. Leaders of KSA,TUR,EGY,ISR have had few sympathizers in #US yet alliances w/ these nations have been beneficial for the US throughout modern history

..Today every time Erdo/MBS/Sisi/Bibi say or do smth that angers West we see discussions about how alliances with their countries should be re-evaluated. In case with Russia – let’s be honest – many don’t just think RUS-SYR-IRN alliance should be re-evaluated,but wish it to fail

..Hence, my argument on the “wishful thinking” – we tend to project our desires onto perceptions and in case of Russia-Assad-Iran it’s been happening way too often. My point is it too renders bad services for actual policy-makers.

18.Everything said, illicit dealings of Assad & his cronies long been an open secret.Many policy-makers in Moscow recognize it’s a problem for promotion of political process and fund-raising for reconstruction. Others think it’s fine since that’s how things always work in Mideast

19.We don’t know what #Putin thinks of this (perhaps,concedes both “camps” are right).Yet #Russia 'd indeed want #Syria/n elites to do some of their own heavy lifting / not put spokes to the wheels RU tries to lubricate (Constitutional Committee, ceasefires, talks with #Turkey)

20.Yet saying that Moscow having a change of heart this very moment based on the reports that made this much noise is a mistake.If #Russia is to push for #Assad’s departure(unlikely),it’s(even more)unlikely going to do so thru his public humiliation,dif toolkit will be at play

21. After all, as I concluded, all these deliberations are not about #Russia’s attitude towards #Assad rather about thinking of #Moscow's own future in #Syria and the pursuit for new pillars of this policy in the post-#COVID-19 #MiddleEast.
THE END (sorry, longish it came out)