Hanna Notte Profile picture
Oct 6 5 tweets 5 min read
Not making headlines, the @OPCW Executive Council is in session this week.

Despite zero progress in clarification on the #Navalny poisoning - with #Russia issuing denials & accusations - #Western states seem to have decided NOT to up the ante vis-a-vis Russia at this time..(1/5)
... unlike some have called for @StrickerNonpro: fdd.org/analysis/2022/…

Looking at statements issued at the Council this week, many - US, UK, Finland, Romania, Latvia, Germany, etc - recall #Navalny poisoning & bemoan lack of #Russian cooperation to date,...(2/5)
..but there seems to be no push to escalate the issue (ie. initiate procedures similar to those that led to #Syria's suspension from #OPCW last year).

I wonder why.

Desire not to further add to pile of problems with #Russia? Keep minimum engagement in multilateral fora? (3/5)
Especially at a time when concerns abound re: #chemical incidents, or even prospective chemical weapons use, in #Ukraine - as painstakingly documented by #OPCW in its "Compendium of correspondence shared by States Parties on Ukraine"?

opcw.org/sites/default/…
As I've argued, were procedures to be started that could lead to #Russia suspension @OPCW, it would likely outright leave (see UNHRC precedent in April)

It seems Western states -for whatever reason- are not prepared to push things to that point yet (5/5)
foreignpolicy.com/2021/04/19/org…

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More from @HannaNotte

Oct 6
On #OPEC cuts: Narrative that "Saudi is screwing us (i.e. West) on oil" is part of the problem - as seen by many in the #MiddleEast.
They resent expectation that #Saudi "should help" keep prices low to a) mitigate fallout of #RussiaUkraineWar & b) cater to US domestic politics.
We may disagree, but do well to understand where they're coming from more broadly:

Since Feb, a reluctance in Gulf capitals (& elsewhere in #MiddleEast) to take action "with" the West "against" Russia in #RussiaUkraineWar (join sanctions, pump more oil) has had multiple layers:
1. A perception that the war is not “theirs” + a tendency to view it as fuelled in part by US/#NATO actions vis Russia (rather than as a Russian war of aggression against #Ukraine).
Unlike in the #West, the war does not register as a test for a “rules-based international order”
Read 8 tweets
Aug 26
6 months into #Russia’s aggression against #Ukraine, there are mostly losers.

One potential winner is #Turkey, given 2nd-order effects of the war.

Since Feb, Ankara has gained some leverage vis-a-vis both #Russia and #NATO.

An attempt at a (complicated) balance sheet🧵(1/18)
Since Feb, #Turkey has attempted a careful balancing act on #RussiaUkraineWar:
-No sanctions against #Russia
-No boycott of Russian #gas
-#Erdogan engaging #Putin frequently & visibly
-Giving #Ukraine #BayraktarTB2
-Invoking Montreux Convention

I could go on and on (2/18)
As a result of
1) Turkey successfully mediating grain exports from Ukraine ports &
2) #Russia increasingly shunning traditional mediation platforms (Geneva),
Turkey is poised to become chief intermediary on operational issues re #RussiaUkraineWar
un.org/en/black-sea-g… (3/18)
Read 18 tweets
Jul 25
Yday, #Lavrov’s confirmation in #Cairo that #Russia seeks to “help the Ukrainian people to free themselves” from their regime gained - understandably -considerable attention in Western capitals.

But it might obscure other important aspects of #Lavrov’s visit to #Egypt. A 🧵1/14
There was much hype around #Putin meeting #Iranian & #Turkish leaders last week

But #Lavrov's engaged the Arabs extensively since Feb, visiting Algeria, Oman, Bahrain, Saudi. He also hosted other Arab FMs in Moscow

Now Egypt, where he also engaged the League of Arab States 2/14
This effort to engage evenly – Iran, Turkey, Israel, Arabs – is a long-standing feature of #Russia’s MENA policy, but will become more important in light of Western #sanctions.

Losing further friends would be costly, even in a region that’s of 2ndary importance to #Russia. 3/14
Read 14 tweets
May 29
The imperative that we must not waver in supporting #Ukraine is reinforced by a factor we often overlook in our #West-centric bubble:

#Russia is not isolated globally.

Pushing back against Russia thus 1) takes extra effort & 2) is of strategic importance beyond #Ukraine (1/11)
For proof that #Russia is not isolated, look toward big parts of Asia, LatAm, Africa, Middle East. Voting patterns at #UNGA. Who hasn’t joint sanctions against #Russia. How media beyond the "West" reports on the war in #Ukraine. And most of all: Look at #China and #India. (2/11)
Let’s take #MiddleEast: Sure, there’s few staunch supporters of #Russia (Syria). Most "sit on the fence": Reluctant to join sanctions; Saudis/UAE won't pump more oil; Even #NATO ally (!) #Turkey & closest US ally #Israel tread cautiously due to security concerns vis Russia (3/11)
Read 11 tweets
Apr 18
Many worry that #Russia might turn to #ChemicalWeapons in #Ukraine, as things go increasingly poorly for it on the battlefield.

In my latest for the @washingtonpost, I examine the (limited) options to deter/punish such a horrible scenario: washingtonpost.com/outlook/2022/0…

🧵/1
The #USA/#NATO have few good options for deterring #Russia’s use of #ChemicalWeapons (CW) in #Ukraine - or punishing such use after the fact, since “the toolkit of punishments includes the very deterrents that failed to change Moscow’s calculus in the first place.” /2
I examine the lessons from multiple failures to deter #ChemicalWeapons use in #Syria, concluding: “It is hard to prevent a highly motivated actor from chemical use, especially if the deterring side fails to respond decisively to the first crossing of the “red line.” /3
Read 9 tweets
Apr 11
What will happen, should #Russia use #ChemicalWeapons (CW) in #Ukraine as it escalates in the Donbas?

Russia’s tactics @OPCW & UNSC over CW use in #Syria & the Navalny poisoning offer good indications.

Bottom line: Attribution/accountability will be a very hard lift

Thread /1
A few weeks ago, US/#NATO officials raised alarm over possible Russian CW use in #Ukraine (framed by #Russia as false-flag op conducted by UA “radicals”), warning this would be “game changer” & would elicit an “aggressive response”. Yet, no clear red line was communicated. /2
Meanwhile, a #NATO official suggested that, were there to be a CW attack delivered by mil. means, attribution to #Russia would be “immediate”. The key Q, so said official, was thus: "Is #Russia going to want to stay below the threshold of attribution?” /3
Read 18 tweets

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