Not making headlines, the @OPCW Executive Council is in session this week.
Despite zero progress in clarification on the #Navalny poisoning - with #Russia issuing denials & accusations - #Western states seem to have decided NOT to up the ante vis-a-vis Russia at this time..(1/5)
Looking at statements issued at the Council this week, many - US, UK, Finland, Romania, Latvia, Germany, etc - recall #Navalny poisoning & bemoan lack of #Russian cooperation to date,...(2/5)
..but there seems to be no push to escalate the issue (ie. initiate procedures similar to those that led to #Syria's suspension from #OPCW last year).
I wonder why.
Desire not to further add to pile of problems with #Russia? Keep minimum engagement in multilateral fora? (3/5)
Especially at a time when concerns abound re: #chemical incidents, or even prospective chemical weapons use, in #Ukraine - as painstakingly documented by #OPCW in its "Compendium of correspondence shared by States Parties on Ukraine"?
As I've argued, were procedures to be started that could lead to #Russia suspension @OPCW, it would likely outright leave (see UNHRC precedent in April)
It seems Western states -for whatever reason- are not prepared to push things to that point yet (5/5) foreignpolicy.com/2021/04/19/org…
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
On #OPEC cuts: Narrative that "Saudi is screwing us (i.e. West) on oil" is part of the problem - as seen by many in the #MiddleEast.
They resent expectation that #Saudi "should help" keep prices low to a) mitigate fallout of #RussiaUkraineWar & b) cater to US domestic politics.
We may disagree, but do well to understand where they're coming from more broadly:
Since Feb, a reluctance in Gulf capitals (& elsewhere in #MiddleEast) to take action "with" the West "against" Russia in #RussiaUkraineWar (join sanctions, pump more oil) has had multiple layers:
1. A perception that the war is not “theirs” + a tendency to view it as fuelled in part by US/#NATO actions vis Russia (rather than as a Russian war of aggression against #Ukraine).
Unlike in the #West, the war does not register as a test for a “rules-based international order”
As a result of 1) Turkey successfully mediating grain exports from Ukraine ports & 2) #Russia increasingly shunning traditional mediation platforms (Geneva),
Turkey is poised to become chief intermediary on operational issues re #RussiaUkraineWar un.org/en/black-sea-g… (3/18)
Yday, #Lavrov’s confirmation in #Cairo that #Russia seeks to “help the Ukrainian people to free themselves” from their regime gained - understandably -considerable attention in Western capitals.
But it might obscure other important aspects of #Lavrov’s visit to #Egypt. A 🧵1/14
But #Lavrov's engaged the Arabs extensively since Feb, visiting Algeria, Oman, Bahrain, Saudi. He also hosted other Arab FMs in Moscow
Now Egypt, where he also engaged the League of Arab States 2/14
This effort to engage evenly – Iran, Turkey, Israel, Arabs – is a long-standing feature of #Russia’s MENA policy, but will become more important in light of Western #sanctions.
Losing further friends would be costly, even in a region that’s of 2ndary importance to #Russia. 3/14
Pushing back against Russia thus 1) takes extra effort & 2) is of strategic importance beyond #Ukraine (1/11)
For proof that #Russia is not isolated, look toward big parts of Asia, LatAm, Africa, Middle East. Voting patterns at #UNGA. Who hasn’t joint sanctions against #Russia. How media beyond the "West" reports on the war in #Ukraine. And most of all: Look at #China and #India. (2/11)
Let’s take #MiddleEast: Sure, there’s few staunch supporters of #Russia (Syria). Most "sit on the fence": Reluctant to join sanctions; Saudis/UAE won't pump more oil; Even #NATO ally (!) #Turkey & closest US ally #Israel tread cautiously due to security concerns vis Russia (3/11)
The #USA/#NATO have few good options for deterring #Russia’s use of #ChemicalWeapons (CW) in #Ukraine - or punishing such use after the fact, since “the toolkit of punishments includes the very deterrents that failed to change Moscow’s calculus in the first place.” /2
I examine the lessons from multiple failures to deter #ChemicalWeapons use in #Syria, concluding: “It is hard to prevent a highly motivated actor from chemical use, especially if the deterring side fails to respond decisively to the first crossing of the “red line.” /3
Russia’s tactics @OPCW & UNSC over CW use in #Syria & the Navalny poisoning offer good indications.
Bottom line: Attribution/accountability will be a very hard lift
Thread /1
A few weeks ago, US/#NATO officials raised alarm over possible Russian CW use in #Ukraine (framed by #Russia as false-flag op conducted by UA “radicals”), warning this would be “game changer” & would elicit an “aggressive response”. Yet, no clear red line was communicated. /2
Meanwhile, a #NATO official suggested that, were there to be a CW attack delivered by mil. means, attribution to #Russia would be “immediate”. The key Q, so said official, was thus: "Is #Russia going to want to stay below the threshold of attribution?” /3