Thread by @JessicaWestPhD

MORNING DAY 2, SESSION 3, #SpaceThreatsOEWG

Topic 1: norms, rules, and principles derived from existing legal and normative frameworks

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#Mexico emphasizes principles in Article 1 of the #OST.

#PAROS and primacy of peaceful use are key. Rejects placement of weapons in outer space and celestial bodies. esp. those with indiscriminate effects.

#Mexico supports giving legal principles greater precision, and the adoption of norms as interim step to legal instrument to ban weapons in space and use of force and prohibit war

#IHL. Public exchange of info. Supports DA ASAT test moratorium as interim step to legal agreement.

#SouthKorea: Examples stemming from existing principles include:
- Not conducting destructive DA ASAT testing
- Operating space objects with due regard to interests of other states and avoiding harmful interference
- Contributing to mitigation of space debris

#SouthKorea has an interest in complementing NOTIFICATION mechanism to strengthen TCBM. Help to avoid miscommunication and misunderstanding.

Also interested in exchange of information.

#Cuba: pace should be used to benefit of all regardless of development. Must guarantee peaceful use at all times. These are CORE provisions. Must be reaffirmed at #SpaceThreatsOEWG.

But: Applicable legal regime does not guarantee PAROS. Need to consolidate and bolster.

#Cuba: Norms do not replace need for binding standards.
- Need express prohibition of placement of weapons of any kind in space. Should all be able to agree. Draft #PPWT.
- Commitment of no first placement
- Should not deny legit right to use space for peaceful ends.

#Sweden: space is a global common to be used for benefit of all

International law including #IHL apply to activities in outer space

#Swedent identifies examples of irresponsible behaviour: deliberate creation of space debris through the use of kinetic force, RPO carried out without prior consent, non-kinetic threats i.e. damage vital functions, loss of control, or disrupt critical civilian uses

#Sweden: Supports #UNGA resolution on moratorium on destructive DA #ASAT testing. Welcomes commitments by other states.

#Turkey: Cosponsored UNGA res against destructive ASAT testing.

Highlights no national appropriation. Benefit and welfare of all countries. Registration convention.

#Pakistan: Recommendations from OEWG must provide: unequivocal reaffirmation of existing international space law; universalisation of existing 5 core treaties; non-discriminatory and equitable.
Must not legitimize/preserve weapons capabilities

#Pakistan cont: Contribute to additional binding rules for PAROS and reverse ongoing weaponization; not negatively impact right to access space for peaceful use; affirm equal security for all states.

Focus only on threats to space system = tenuous at best. Must be broader.

#Pakistan Greatest threat = IDEOLOGY AND POLICIES that consider it as new warfighting frontier and actions leading toward weaponization.

Should uphold Article 2 UN Charter = refrain from use or threat or use of force.

#Swizerland emphasizes Article 2 of UN Charter prohibiting use of force; Article 51 applies but highly restrictive.

Reiterates existing restrictions/obligations under Article 4 and 9 of the OST.

#IHL applies to kinetic/non-kinetic operations. Limitations on any use of force

#Switzerland: Concludes that any activities in outer space cannot impact the freedom of other states to use space or enter into conflict or interfere with any other rights.

#Brazil: Hope that new #GGE = opportunity to translate recommendations of OEWG into groundwork for progress on possible legal agreement on PARSO.

Must ensure that both for a complement each other.

#Brazil: OEWG should recognize legal principles OST and build upon them.

Could benefit from analogies with law of sea and international environmental law, esp for concepts of due diligence and due regard. Obligation not to alter space environment i.e. ENMOD treaty.

#Australia: Task here = to clarify non-binding norms and rules to address irresponsible behaviours identified last session. Successful example = moratorium on destructive DA #ASAT tests. Last meeting demonstrated widespread support.

#Australia notes key principles outlined in #OST.

Regarding #IHL: considers it likely that certain customary law obligations apply to armed conflict in from to or through outer space. Does not promote conflict in space.

#Australia: focus = behaviours that are NOT prohibited but that DO raise tensions and possible miscalculation.

Propose clear communication and info exchange protocols for when satellites operating near each other. We see this type of mechanism in other domains such as maritime

#Australia: states should commit to:
not conduct destructive DA ASAT testing;
operate in, from, to and through space safely;
avoid endangering lives of humans in space;
avoid creating harmful interference;
avoid creating long lived orbital debris

#Austrlia cont states should:
publish info about national space policies, strategies, doctrine, expenditures, activities;
communicate and make notifications to enhance stability;
establish, maintain, and utilize communications channels

#Singapore: Supports full implementation of applicable international law as well as relevant UNGA resolutions including destructive DA #ASAT testing moratorium, no first placement, and further practical measures #PAROS

#UAE: space activities not a race. Enables international cooperation, builds capabilities, serves humankind.

Accessibility key. Should minimize risk without limiting countries' capabilities and space systems.

Calls for coordination with other UN bodies i.e. COPUOS, UNOOSA

#Russia Any steps aimed at using outer space for military operations fueled by desire to impose military primacy is dangerous and has negative influence on peace and security. Destabilizing. Arms race.

#Russia calls attention to the following legal obligations:

UN Charter, PTBT, Legal principles 1963, OST, Liability Convention, ENMOD.

Highlights core principles of OST.

#Russia notes gaps in existing legal framework. Need to fill to address #PAROS.

Should not be considered as a REVISION of existing legal standards. Not a REVIEW.

Non-binding rules can only COMPLEMENT but not REPLACE legally binding instruments

#Russia calls for ban on use/threat of force against space objects and comprehensive ban on space-based offensive weapons to attack space objects.

Comprehensive legally binding instrument on #PAROS. Space shall not be used as a place for weapons.

Recalls draft #PPWT treaty.

#Russia on #IHL: intended for application in armed conflict, which automatically leads to conclusion of possibility of armed conflict in space, which is counter to international law whereby activities can only be peaceful.

Space law = role of legal subcommittee COPUOS.

#Italy: notion of responsible behaviour should include avoiding degrading space enviro including long-lasting debris; fulfil wide range of functions i.e. improve clarity of intentions, reduce risk misperception, help to avoid confrontation, share information to build trust

#Italy: dual-use nature of space means that rules should cover all dimension of space activities/actors based on principle of non-harmful interference

#Italy also calls on building on existing voluntary commitments including 2013 GGE TCBMS and COPUOS LTS guidelines

#EU: OST and guiding principles = basis of global governance outer space. Any norm of responsible behaviour should be consistent with and complement those texts because they are essential framework for peaceful use of outer space for benefit of all nations.

#EU: further practical steps can be taken to reduce risk, prevent conflict, and PAROS. Important given ambiguity of what constitutes a weapon in outer space. Must build confidence, decrease perception of threats and avoid escalation.

Do not exclude possibility of new LBI.

#EU: fully supported UNGA 77/41 resolution and welcomes commitments not to conduct destructive DA ASAT tests. Consider such commitments as pragmatic, concrete, measurable step forward.

#EU publishing and sharing info about policies, doctrines and strategies = responsible.

Sharing info including prelaunch notification = established practice #HCOC. Encourage all states to subscribe to HCOC and fully implement.

2013 GGE TCBM still relevant.

#EU: see value norms related to creation debris, RPO, or activities that impair space-based services critical to public or harm civilians. Proximity operations that affect other states system should be discussed, emphasize information and commination.

#EU: Possible norms could be discussed on operations having impact on security of peoples and goods.

#India: see EOV UNGA res 76/231. Nonetheless, participating in OEWG substantively.

Preference for legal because stronger guarantee of compliance. But open to development of universal, non-discriminatory norms and TCBMs because can contribute to LBI.

#India: some merit to BEHAVIOUR. But: subjectivity of perception of threats and behaviors. Who does this and how is a concern. Also concerned about verification of space space behaviour using current tech and access to data. Need further discussion.

#India: Draw attention to 2013 GGE TCBM para 34 and 35 = criteria for TCBM.

#Philippines: considers 1967 OST as foundational to space law

Emphasizes duty of due regard. No intent to reopen article 9 OST but a rich resource. Consistency of international law demands that application not deviate significantly from high seas.

#Philppines notes other obligation article 9 OST including non-harmful interference/consultations and welcomes #Japan suggestion to create a mechanism for such consultation.

Calls on all to adhere to #HCOC

#Chile is committed to confidence and trust through dialogue, emphasizes centrality of international law including the UN Charter should apply to outer space as a basis for norms.

#Iran notes threats from increasing weaponization/militarization of outer space. Notes that private actors engaged space launch activities and applications

Highlights inadequacy of existing legal instruments in face of new challenges.

#Iran: #PAROS is priority. Negotiate LBI in CD

Sees norms as political. Distinction b/w responsible/irresponsible is subjective and politically divisive; based on social science instead of law; driven by political agenda. Ideological and coercive.

(social science burn, ouch)

#Iran notes value of previous GGE #PAROS

#Iran: commercial/military systems driving hostile action against other countries. Refers to "illegal" operation of broadband service Starlink within Iran by SpaceX with US government support. Not civilian. Violates sovereignty.

Must respect local law/landing rights.

#Iran defends right to launch satellites for remote sensing, recalling #US statement from yesterday.

Note the statement did not question this right but rather noted that the satellites had not been registered with the UN per the Registration Convention.

#NewZealand suggests 5 principles:
1. conducted in accordance with international law including IHL. Behaviour contrary to international law cannot be responsible
2. Some behaviour may not be responsible even where permissible

#NewZealand cont:
3. Transparency and communication = strong basis for minimizing threat perception, build trust and reduce risk of misperception/escalation.
4. deliberate creation of debris is irresponsible.
5. States should not intentionally damage critical infrastructure.

#Japan reiterates importance of international law including #IHL

#Norway: even in absence of “weapons” still potential for misperception and possible conflict in outer space

space is not in a legal vacuum (thank-you!)

Article 3 OST: IHL applies in space

#Germany: recognize premacy of legal framework over non-binding norms. But principles, norms and rules can make useful contribution by informing state practice in application of law.

#TCBMs identified 2013 GGE still need to be implemented

#Germany believes that IHL is applicable in times of armed conflict in outer space. Some view this will lead to military conflict. But applicability of IHL does NOT legitimize threat/use of force in outer space, forbidden by UN Charter. Minimizes negative effects armed conflict

#Algeria: Concern about increasing threat of arms race in outer space. #PAROS is imperative. All must refrain from activities that would compromise peace/security such as placement of any forms of weapons in outer space

#Algeria: Use of outer space requires transparency and better TCBMs to enhance responsibility of actions, peaceful use and PAROS.

Highlights primary role of CD for legally binding agreement on PAROS

#Netherlands:
1. no doubt applicability international law outer space.
2. soft law does not prevent development of hard law as we have seen enviro law
3. space law contains principles that guide us i.e. due regard. our job is to determine how to apply them; behaviour key.

#Netherlands cont:
4. support specifying what it means to have due regard, avoid harmful interference etc. #UK and #US written submissions helpful
5. refer to commitment not to conduct destructive DA ASAT tests as example of a norm

#China: sees hard law and soft law as complementary. China supports BOTH processes. Rejects those states who would want to negotiate soft law instrument while standing in the way of negotiating legal instrument on PAROS in CD.

#China IHL applies to armed conflict. But we are discussing PAROS/preventing weaponization in outer space or armed conflict in outer space. If we discuss IHL, it equates to discussing the rules of armed conflict. This is not inline with the purpose of this meeting/rong message.

LUNCH BREAK 🧑‍🍳

Still a few more on the speakers list on the topic of norms derived from existing international legal and normative frameworks

Right of reply by #Russia re statements by #US and #EU re "special operation" in #Ukraine

Russia seems to be referring to use of civilian satellites for military purposes and reinforcing view that they are legitimate military targets esp. because no treaty barring use of force

Right of reply by #US: notes challenges posed by civil and miliary activities for all of us. Clear message here is that rules must apply to ALL countries. Thus when Russia seeks commercial images from China, do the same rules apply?

Done for real.