Thread by @thomasjuneau

Thread on predictions for the Middle East in 2019:
1. Assad will continue to consolidate control over Syria; its normalization will also steadily continue as it reestablishes diplomatic ties with a growing number of countries.
2. This will highlight two dynamics: the... (1/n)

...growing costs for Iran & Russia of their victory in Syria (they are stuck in a long-term quagmire, as Syria will remain fragmented and devastated for a long time) and the dilemma for the west: engage Assad, and you legitimize one of the most brutal mass murderers of... (2/n)

...past decades, or don't engage Assad, and then you are limited in what you can do about the millions of suffering Syrians given the extent of the humanitarian crisis in the country.
3. The Islamic Republic will not collaspe
4. The JCPOA will survive but barely as the...(3/n)

...P4+1 (the remaining parties to the deal) all keep an interest in ensuring the semi-fiction of its survival
5. Sanctions will increasingly hurt Iran; there will be a growing realization in the regime that a few more years of such pain will increasingly threaten the regime (4/n)

6. Peace will not come to Yemen, and neither will relief; the humanitarian crisis will worsen before it improves. There could be limited progress in minor confidence building measures between the Houthis and the Hadi government, but it will not fundamentally change the... (5/n)

...dynamics of the conflict. As a result, the Houthis will continue to get closer to Iran, and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula will continue to entrench itself. That is, the two main US interests in Yemen will continue to be damaged. (6/n)

7. The US *will not* withdraw from the Middle East, apocalyptic predictions by liberal internationalists and neoconservatives notwithsanding. It will continue its modest retrenchment, which in itself is a good thing. That said, the improvisation, lousy coordination... (7/n)

...and planning, and horrible communications of the Trump Administration will eliminate the modest gains that limited retrencment would have brought. If anything, this will damage the future credibility of those who, like me, advocate for restraint in US policy... (8/n)

...in the region.
8. MbS will survive the year; he has consolidated power to such an extent that his position is secure. I will go on a limb here and say that I expect less foreign policy recklessness on his part in 2019. It would be a stretch to say he has been chastened...(9/n)

... but I think he gets it that more Qatars/Yemens/Canadas/Hariris/Khashoggis/Ritz-Carleton, etc. would, at some not so distant point, just not be sustainable, not only for Saudi-US ties (opposition in Congress will continue to mount) but within the Saudi regime as well. (10/n)

9. The status quo in Egypt will continue, but it will be increasingly apparent that it is not sustainable in the longer term. Sisi is even more brutal and repressive than Mubarak. The opposition and civil society have been beaten down, but the socio-economic indicators ... (11/n)

that led to the 2011 explosion are all still there - if anything, even more so.
10. Last: a cliché to finish, but I expect many surprises and, as always more muddling along than I would have thought (12/12).

11. Another one: to absolutely no one's surprise, it will be clear in 2019 that Islamic State is far from defeated. As Assad continues to consolidate control over a devastated Syria with millions of alienated Sunnis, IS will maintain a long-term stronghold there. (13/12)