,
12 tweets,
4 min read
Read on Twitter
THREAD: I have no idea whether Trump and Kim will announce steps related to Yongbyon in a few hours. But @mhanham’s exceptional thread 👇and some conversations we’ve having inspired some counterintuitive thoughts.
2. After a series of concessions, the Trump administration is finally closing in on a reasonable approach to talks. That's for the best, but let's be clear that the concessions sapped their credibility and wasted the year of greatest promise—and they're still lacking a strategy.
3. The policy so far has been the worst of both worlds: the Trump team has continually issued unrealistic demands, then dropped them. On the other hand, there has been a tendency to grasp at what is on offer. It’s not a policy to just dismantle anything you can get your hands on.
4. An effective policy requires developing and advancing a cap on the nuclear program that is calibrated to provide specific security benefits for the US and allies. @jkwarden & @nktpnd make that case here: thebulletin.org/2019/02/goals-…. We’ll have much more on this within days.
5. Dismantling the Yongbyon reactors can serve as a crucial component of a cap, limiting the plutonium and tritium the regime can produce, reprocess, and craft into effective warheads. With only uranium, the arsenal could expand, but under certain weight and yield constraints.
6. Two implications. First, steps at Yongbyon must stop, disable, and ideally dismantle the reactors. Though there are other important facilities at Yongbyon, measures that leave the reactors operational and un-safeguarded are of very limited value.
7. Second, if the US intelligence community has information about another reactor or another reliable source of plutonium or tritium, the value of Yongbyon closure plummets.
8. But: even if disarmament doesn't happen a year or a decade, we shouldn't hinder with that goal. @SiegfriendHecker calls Yongbyon the “heart” of the DPRK program, which is true in the sense that it was instrumental at producing early materials. washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pac…
9. We don’t want to let Pyongyang Punggye-ri Yongbyon. That is, we don’t want to let them dismantle it in a way that conceals or destroys information about their early program (or adds safety or proliferation risks).
10. Without examining the graphite and other components, it would massively increase the error bounds in our estimate of the program. Depending on the specifics of an agreement, it may be preferable to leave the reactor inoperative but intact until it can be exploited safely.
11. The new presumed ELWR should be disabled and dismantled. If that thing switches on, it ends negotiations and obliterates any cap. Gaining access to centrifuges, reprocessing, and fuel fabrication could be valuable, but is even more unlikely.
12. In short, the value of announced steps at Yongbyon are extremely dependent on specifics. We won’t get a joint statement that describes major, specific steps on acceptable terms and verification—but even if we did, it is still just theater until it is rigorously implemented.
