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A slightly longer working preview relevant to today's news (which is not really news or at least not surprising as USTR indicated it was using 103(a) a few weeks ago): For those who aren't as familiar w/103(a) (see below), this poorly worded text gives the Pres. wide authority /1 
to enter into "trade agreements" & to proclaim tariff modifications as necessary to carry out the trade agrmt, but doesn't make any connection between the factfinding that it requires the pres. to do prior to entering into the agreement & the content of the agreement itself /2
to name just one flaw. To give a rather silly example - could the pres. find an import restriction in Country X ("any foreign country") & use that as a basis for entering into an agrmt w/Country Y ("with foreign countries")? That's not what is happening with the Japan agrmt /3
but it gives a sense of the problems with the statutory language. The language is even more strained where it limits the president only with respect to "substantial" modifications or additional provisions. Apart from whatever substantial means, it then says that /4
those (substantial changes/provisions) will "not be eligible for approval" under what seems to refer to fast-track but is even more unclear. All this seems to suggest that, perhaps most importantly, even if Congress doesn't approve or thinks the pres. crossed the "substantial" /5
threshold, Congress didn't leave itself any way to prevent the president from entering into such an agreement. Short of passing legislation contrary to it (or amending this strained text!), 103(a) seems a pretty significant blank check on trade exec. agrmts. /6
Not to mention that what about the Section actually limits it to addressing just tariff barriers as the title suggests? (Sure there's a constraint on changing domestic law, but the pres. can do a whole lot short of that as we have already seen!). [Other thoughts welcome] /end
