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Thanks. It's actually not so complicated. Putin thinks he has the right not just to take a piece of Ukraine away from it (Crimea), but to control the country. As direct control through corrupt elites hasn't worked, he has moved towards another strategy, invasion with proxies. /1
This must be seen in the context of Moldova and Georgia where Russia controls / occupies parts of the country and has more or less managed to control their course. In both cases Western reactions were weak, and Putin probably expected a similar behavior in the case of Ukraine. /2
Ukraine however was a gamble: it is much bigger and geographically closer to the West than Georgia. But when there was no strong reaction to the annexation of Crimea, rather confusion in Europe and the US, Putin moved ahead with invading Donbas. /3
Yet this was too much. Germany is the swing state with regard to Russia in Europe. Merkel tipped the balance towards a pro-Ukrainian policy. She was outraged, and brought Obama, who was first detached, in. Once the US was committed, Merkel and Obama brought others in line. /4
Economic sanctions ("level 3") which most thought impossible became a reality. Western reaction helped Ukraine in its resistance, helped stopping Russian / proxy military advance by making Putin reconsider costs. Merkel also built an off-ramp with the Minsk agreement. /5
So Putin stopped, held what he had won with military means, and started to the play the long game. Over time, he expected "weak" Western democratic leaders to fall for his mix of carrots (including corruption) and sticks (threats of nuclear war). /6
His goals remained unchanged: control of Ukraine and good relations with the west, especially economic relations, but also prestigious summits and the ability to influence other players' behavior -- all important for the survival of his autocratic-oligarchic regime. /7
With Trump, he faced a U.S. president who apparently wanted a rapprochement but was held back by other powerful players in the U.S. When Macron called for a rapprochement, the crucial European front seemed to weaken. France so far had followed the German lead. /8
Now Macron wants to take the lead himself. And he articulates, in his speech to the French ambassadors, a vision of Europe in which the US is out and Russia is in. That's exactly what the most pro-Kremlin German "Putinversteher" have always dreamed of. Music in Putin's ears. /9
Yet it is unclear whether Macron wants to pay real costs to move ahead with a rapprochement, especially by alienating Central Europe, and it is unclear whether Merkel will effectively bloc him. That's why Putin has used the proposed Paris meeting as a test. /10
Putin puts conditions on the table for the "Normandy" meeting that would indicate an outcome supporting the Russian interpretation of the Minsk agreement, as a path to Russian control of Donbas. If such an outcome is not guaranteed or likely, Putin will let Macron wait. /11
His long game is to wait out Merkel, his key opponent in Europe. He probably thinks that after Merkel the European front will fall apart, and he has plenty of evidence: huge numbers of European politicians and leaders seeking contact and calling for reset and rapprochement. /12
