(1/x) This is very *big*. And certain to get overlooked amid daily coverage of US-China relations/trade war/impeachment stuff.
But let me try to drill down on why this is absolutely crucial. (with h/t to @stuartbasten, whose book is a must-read on this subject.)
But let me try to drill down on why this is absolutely crucial. (with h/t to @stuartbasten, whose book is a must-read on this subject.)
@stuartbasten (2/x) Naturally, it is well known that China is rapidly aging. *Official* data - from both the Chinese government and the United Nations - predict the share of China's population aged 65+ will rise as follows.
2019 11.5%
2027 15%
2037 22%
2046 25%
2019 11.5%
2027 15%
2037 22%
2046 25%
@stuartbasten (3/x) What is less appreciated is that those estimates are all based on the assumption that China's total fertility rate somehow rises to the 1.7-1.8 child/woman level - and stays there - for decades into the future.
Call that into question, and things change dramatically.
Call that into question, and things change dramatically.
@stuartbasten (4/x) Note that other East Asian societies - Japan, South Korea, Taiwan - that are ahead of the P.R.C. in terms of the demographic aging process are nowhere near that level. Japan is around 1.4. Taiwan and South Korea are lower - around 1.1-1.2.
@stuartbasten (5/x) What the dramatic decline in the birth rate flagged by @nickm4rro & @TheEIU_China might represent is that the P.R.C. is now undergoing what South Korea & Taiwan experienced over the past 2 decades - a decline from merely low fertility rates to *super-low* fertility rates.
@stuartbasten @nickm4rro @TheEIU_China (6/x) Start looking at South Korea or Taiwan as proxies for where China might go, and the picture begins to look a lot different. Here, for example, is the current demographic forecast for South Korea.
% of elderly (65+)
2020 16%
2030 25%
2040 33%
2050 38%
2060 41%
% of elderly (65+)
2020 16%
2030 25%
2040 33%
2050 38%
2060 41%
@stuartbasten @nickm4rro @TheEIU_China (7/x) Note: that's derived from this source (population.un.org/wpp/DataQuery/). Allows you to run comparisons between UN data on different countries.
Note also Korean data itself assumes a partial rebound of the fertility rate from current super-low rate over the next couple decades.
Note also Korean data itself assumes a partial rebound of the fertility rate from current super-low rate over the next couple decades.
@stuartbasten @nickm4rro @TheEIU_China (8/x) Now return to China.
Remember that *official* data (based on 1.7-1.8 fertility rate assumption) already shows China:
a) moving from (by 2046) to look like 2019 Japan (currently 25% of the population aged 65+) in terms of aging, and
b) hovering at 30% for decades after.
Remember that *official* data (based on 1.7-1.8 fertility rate assumption) already shows China:
a) moving from (by 2046) to look like 2019 Japan (currently 25% of the population aged 65+) in terms of aging, and
b) hovering at 30% for decades after.
@stuartbasten @nickm4rro @TheEIU_China (9/x) Change the underlying assumptions - which seems merited given drop in births + experience of other East Asian societies - and all that goes out the window.
@stuartbasten @nickm4rro @TheEIU_China (10/x) I *think* (and I'd want a real demographer like @stuartbasten to confirm), it:
a) moves China's aging process forward by a decade - i.e., China looks like Japan today (re: aging) by late 2030s, not 2040s, and:
b) ensures China's elderly surges above 40% of population
a) moves China's aging process forward by a decade - i.e., China looks like Japan today (re: aging) by late 2030s, not 2040s, and:
b) ensures China's elderly surges above 40% of population
@stuartbasten @nickm4rro @TheEIU_China (11/x) And that is big, big, big. That will have major ramifications for a huge range of things. Size of China's labor force. Stability of pension funds. Eldercare needs. Intergenerational burden on youth to simultaneously care for parents and own children.
