Thread by @samagreene

It's been a while since a major #Putin policy address has been anything other than boring. Not today. Today, Putin proposed a radical reshaping of #Russia's political system.

Kind of.

THREAD #Послание2020

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Notwithstanding all of the various socio-economic and foreign policy statements (most of which are genuinely boring), the crux of Putin's annual address to the Federal Assembly is what looks to be a reasonably sweeping constitutional reform.

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The really big one is a shift of gov't and ministerial accountability from the presidency to the parliament. Under the revised constitution, the Duma would select the PM and approve most ministers, and the president would be obliged to appoint them.

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On the face of it, this would shift power from the presidency -- which would now be strictly limited to two terms -- to the parliament. As a result, a lot of people in Moscow (and elsewhere) are interpreting this as a sign that Putin will shift his power base in 2024.

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It's more complicated and ambiguous than that, though. Despite the very important change to the formation of the gov't, the presidency will still retain control of the security agencies. He'll have to 'consult' with the Fed Council to appoint them, but that's a light touch.

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Moreover, the reform insists on the creation of "a unified system of public power" stretching from the Kremlin to municipalities. Read more executive centralization, not less. And the president retains a constitutional oversight role.

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All of this _could well_ mean that Putin is indeed setting himself up to rule by other means post-2024, maybe as head of United Russia, Speaker of the Duma, or chairman of a revamped State Council, to which the 'unified system of power' might report.

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But it doesn't have to mean as much as people are making of it, and there are good reasons to think it might not. Here are a few.

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For one thing, control over the Duma is tenuous. United Russia has begun to look like a spent force. It's possible that Putin might breathe new life into it, but it's equally possible that he wouldn't and the party would continue to founder. Then what?

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Equally, the centrifugal forces of Russian politics are much stronger in the parliament than in the Kremlin. Right now, with the Duma little more than a rubber stamp, those forces are muted. But shift real power there, and they'll resurface.

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The traction that regional interests and social groups have on budgetary policy in particular will increase. That would, of course, be good for democracy. But it will almost inevitably weaken fiscal discipline, one of Putin's hallmarks.

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The shift will also sharpen party competition, making United Russia's future all the more uncertain -- and thus making the speakership or party leadership a less attractive place for Putin to be.

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And the vaunted 'State Council' -- another mooted seat for Putin -- is potentially powerful, but only potentially. The reform as proposed doesn't give it any formal authority. In the best case, it it could maximize informal authority. But again that's a gamble.

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At the end of the day, this is and remains a risk averse system of power, the cardinal rule of which is not fixing things that aren't broken. Putin and the elites whose interests he protects know that centralizing power in the presidency works, more or less.

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Putin and his elites do not know - cannot know - that a reconfiguration of power will work equally well, or that it will do anything other than deepen the pressures they're already facing.

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What Putin's speech does do, however, is shift the focus of constructive ambiguity off of him and the question of succession, and onto the question of constitutional reform.

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Ever since Putin's reelection in 2018, the key question in Russian politics has been 2024: would he stay, or would he go?

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For two years now, large-scale policymaking has been paralyzed, with each move interpreted as a signal of Putin's plans for the future, and thus a provocation for interested parties to mobilize for or against that future. Another four years of paralysis could be ruinous.

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This reform partly resolves that problem. By putting an expiration date not only on Russia's ministers but on its entire institutional configuration, the gov't can now address structural economic issues and personnel decisions without causing quite as much anxiety.

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Meanwhile, elite maneuvering will shift to shaping the new role of the parliament and the State Council, leaving the gov't to get on with business. And because no one knows exactly how any of this will work post-2024, the 'Putin Question' can be sidestepped. Maybe.

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The problem, of course, is that Putin is not just an important man. He is, for all intents and purposes, Russia's most important _institution_. It is his ability to enjoy the trust of both the elite and the population that keeps this system going.

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Because elite and public trust accrue to Putin rather than his office, it should be possible for them to follow him into any new role.

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Thus, people who want Putin to stay on can look at this reform and see reason to rejoice. But so can people who want him to go, because any new configuration will be riskier and may leave Putin less powerful than he was.

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As a result, the debate over the constitution will almost inevitably devolve into a debate about Putin. Institutions and roles and provisions will be defined with a particular occupant in mind - both by Putin's supporters and his opponents.

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Thus, major policy decisions may now be interpreted as signals not just of Putin's future, but of the constitution's. Unless Putin finds a way to extricate himself either from the constitutional debate or from day-to-day governance, the paralysis will likely remain.

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The rest of today's address -- with its promises of socioeconomic largesse -- make it look unlikely that Putin is planning to step back from day-to-day governance.

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And the only way that Putin removes himself from the constitutional debate is if he announces that he plans to have no role at all in the new configuration. Even if he intends to go, though, it's unlikely that he'll telegraph that until the very last minute.

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This is yet another exercise in keeping all options open. Rather than pointing to a clear future for Russian politics, it allows actors to imagine a multiplicity of futures -- and thus forces them to prepare for all of them. The actual future is still anyone's guess.

/END